The Knowledge of the Separated Soul in the Philosophy of St. Thomas by Lundergan, Louise
Loyola University Chicago
Loyola eCommons
Master's Theses Theses and Dissertations
1941
The Knowledge of the Separated Soul in the
Philosophy of St. Thomas
Louise Lundergan
Loyola University Chicago
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more information, please contact ecommons@luc.edu.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.
Copyright © 1941 Louise Lundergan
Recommended Citation
Lundergan, Louise, "The Knowledge of the Separated Soul in the Philosophy of St. Thomas" (1941). Master's Theses. Paper 270.
http://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_theses/270
THE KNO'NLEDGE OF THE SEPARATED SOUL 
IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF ST. THOMAS 
by 
Mother Louise Lundergan 
A thesis submitted to the faculty of the Graduate School 
of Loyola University in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of Master of Arts. 
1941 
p 
VITA 
Mother Louise Lundergan attended the Sacred 
Heart grammar school. Memphis. Tennesse, and Saint 
Ignatius grammar school, Chicago, Illinois. She 
attended the Academy of the Sacred Heart, Lake 
Forest, Illinois for four years, received her B.A. 
degree from Barat College, Lake Forest, Illinois, 
and a teacher's certificate from the Kenwood Nor-
mal Training school, Albany, New York. Since then 
she has been employed in teaching English and 
Latin at the Academy of the Sacred Heart, Chicago, 
Illinois. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Introduction • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Page 
--y 
Chapter I • • • • • • • • • • • • • 9 
The Nature of the Soul and Its Union with the Body. 
Chapter II• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 29 
The Knowledge of the Soul United to the Body; Haw 
the Soul Knows, 1~at It Knows, the Perfection of 
This Knowledge. 
Chapter III • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 62 
The Knowledge of the Soul Separated from the Body; 
How the Separated Soul Knows, What It Knows, the 
Perfection of This Knowledge. 
Bibliography • • • ~ • • • • • • • • • • 104 
THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE SEPARATED SOl...lL 
IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF ST. THOMAS 
The difficulty in solving the problem of the knowledge of the separated 
soul in the Philosophy of St. Thomas arises from st. Thomas' conception of 
the nature of the soul and its union with the body. He maintains, as we sh 
see further on, that the soul needs the body, and that it is natural for the 
soul to understand by turning to the phantasm which is in a corporeal organ. 
This need of the soul to be united to the body proceeds from the very nature 
of the soul itself. For one who held that the union of soul and body is not 
required by the nature of the soul there would be no difficulty in explain-
ing how the soul knmvs when separated from the body. St. Thomas attributes 
such an opinion to Plato, interpreting Plato's doctrine on the union of soul 
and body thus: 
••• Ponebat enim totam naturam speciei in anima esse, 
dicens hominem non esse aliquid compositum ex anima et 
corpore, sed an~ corpori advenientem; ut sit compa-
ratio animae ad corpus sicut nautae ad navem, vel secuti 
induti ad vestem. 
]2! Anima, q.un.a.l. 
In such a doctrine the question of the knowledge of the separated soul is 
easily solved, for just as the sailor is naturally quite independent of the 
ship in so far as his action is concerned, so too vrould the soul be indepen-
dent of the body in carrying on its proper operation. Instead of having to 
turn to phantasms in order to understand, the soul would be able to under-
1 
p 
stand intelligible things simply. St. Thomas points out: 
• • .quod ista quaestio difficultatem habet ex hoc quod 
anima, quamdiu est corpori conjuncta, non potest aliquid 
intelligere non convertendo se ad phantasmata, ut per 
experimentum patet. Si autem hoc non est ex natura 
animae, sed per accidens hoc convenit ei, ex eo quod 
dorpori alligatur, sicut Platonioi posuerunt; de facili 
quaestio solvi posset. Nam remote impedimento corporis, 
rediret anima ad suam naturam, ut intelligeret intelligi-
bilia simpliciter, non convertendo se ad phantasmata, 
sicut est de aliis substantiis separatis. 
~.Theol.,I.q.89.a.l.,c. 
2 
Such an opinion cannot stand however, for it at least implies that the union 
of soul and body is not for the good of the soul, as it would seem that the 
soul understands better out of the body than in the body. st. Thomas holds 
that the union of soul and body is natural to the soul, and that whatever is 
natural to a thing is good for that thing. 
Videtur etiam sequi ex hac opinione quod unio animae 
ad corpus non sit naturalis: nam quod est naturale 
alicui non impedit ejus propriam operationem. Si 
igitur unio corporis impedit intelligent!~ animae, 
non erit naturale animae corpori uniri, sed contra 
naturam; at ita homo qui oonstituitur ex unione 
animae ad corpus, non erit aliquod naturale: quod 
videtur absurdum. 
E! Anima, q.un.a.l5,c. 
In another place St. Thomas quotes from Eccles., vii, 30. 
Deus fecit hominem rectum. 
He then continues; 
Haec autem fuit rectitudo hominis divinitus insti-
tuti, ut inferiora superioribus subderetur, et 
superiora ab inferioribus non impedirentur ••• 
~.Theel., I.q.94.a.l. 
Therefore the union of the soul with the body is for the good of the soul. 
p 
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Matter that is, exists for the sake of the form, not form for the sake of 
matter. In rejecting the opinion that the union of soul and body is not for 
the good of the soul St. Thomas gives the following argument: 
••• secundum hoc non esset anima corpori unita propter 
melius animae, quia secundum hoc pejus intelligeret 
corpori unita quam separata; sed hoc esset solum propter 
melius corporis: quod est irrationabile, cum materia 
sit propter formam, et non e converso. 
~.Theol., I.q.89.a.l.,c. 
st. Thomas states clearly the difficulty to be found in his own position 
on the question of the union of soul and body. If, as experience proves, 
the soul when united to the body can understand only through the body, how 
can the separated soul understand anything? 
Si aut em ponamus, quod anima ex sua natura habeat ut 
intelligat convertendo se ad phantasmata, cum natura 
animae post mortem corporis non mutetur, videtur quod 
anima tunc naturaliter nihil possit intelligere, cum 
non sint ei praesto phantasmata ad quae convertatur. 
~.Theol., I.q.89.a.l.,c. 
The separated soul cannot understand by innate species, for it has no 
such species to which it can turn. As the separated soul no longer has sense 
imagination, it cannot understand by species abstracted. It cannot under-
stand by species once abstracted and now preserved for in that case the soul 
of a child would understand nothing, for it has no preserved species. Nor 
can the soul be dependent on species infused by God, for that would not be 
of nature but of grace. 
Sed non intelligit per species innatas, quia a principio 
est sicut tabula in qua nihil est scriptum; neque per 
species quas tunc abstrahat a rebus, quia non habet organa 
sensus et imaginationis, quibus mediantibus species intel-
ligibiles abstrahuntur a rebus; neque etiam per species prius 
p 
abstractas et in anima conservatas, quia sic anima pueri 
nihil intelligeret post mortem; neque etiam per species 
intelligibiles divinitus influxas: haec enim cognitio non 
esset naturalis, de qua nunc agitur, sed gratiae •• • 
4 
~.Theol., I.q.89.a.l.,obj.3. 
st. Thomas further develops the fact that the separated soul cannot be de• 
pendent on species formerly abstracted and now preserved in the soul. Not 
only would the souls of children understand nothing after death, but adults 
would be unable to know anything more than they know on earth, which view 
cannot be accepted • 
• • • species receptae prius, et conservatae non sufficiunt 
ad cognitionem quam necesse est ponere in anima separata, 
tum propter animas puerorum, tum propter hoc quod multa 
erunt cognita ab anima separata quae nunc non cognosountur 
a nobis, ut poenae inferni, et alia huiusmodi. 
DeVer. q.l9.a.l.,c. 
st. Thomas offers a solution to the difficulty in the question of the 
knowledge of the separated soul by pointing out that each thing's mode of 
operation follows its mode of existence. Since the soul has one mode of 
existence when united to the body and another when separated from it, it 
follows that the soul has a different mode of operation when united to the 
body than when separated from it, the nature of the soul remaining the same. 
Thus when united to the body, the soul understands by turning to the phan-
tasms which are supplied by means of bodily organs. When separated from the 
body, the soul understands by turning to things that are simply intelligible, 
that is, by participated species which the soul shares with the angels, 
though in a lesser degree. ~bile these participated species arise from the 
Divine Light, it does not follow necessarily that this mode of understanding 
p 
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is Uilllatural to the soul, for God is the author of the influx of the light 
of nature as well as the light of grace. 
• • .anima separata • • • intelligit • • • per species 
ex influentia divini luminis participatas, quarum anima 
fit particeps, sicut et aliae substantiae separatae, 
qua.m.vis inferiori modo. Unde tam cito cessante con-
versione ad corpus, ad corpus, ad superiora convertitur. 
Nee ta.m.en propter hoc cognitio vel potentia non est 
naturalis: quia Deus est auctor non solum influentiae 
gratuiti luminis, sed etia.m. naturalis. 
~.Theol., I.q.89.a.l.ad 3um. 
Now to be united to the body is natural to the soul, while to be separated 
from it is contrary to the soul as form, as is said in the Summa Theologica 
Si enim animae naturale est corpori uniri, esse sine 
corpore est sibi contra natura.m., et sine corpore axis-
tens non habet suae naturae perfectionem. 
(I.q.ll8.a.3.) 
In another place it is said: 
Est igitur contra natura.m. animae absque corpore esse. 
Nihil aute.m quod est contra natura.m., potest esse per• 
petuum. 
~·~·Gent., IV.79. 
As form, it belongs to the very nature of the soul to be united to the body. 
Not being in itself a complete specific nature, the soul requires the body. 
Since, however, the soul is an intellectual principle, its highest and most 
proper operation is to understand • 
• • • intelligere est maxima et propria operatic animae. 
De Anima. q.un.a.l5 
For an intellectual substance, to exist is to know and will. Therefore, the 
soul will continue to know even when separated from the body. Because of 
the weakness of its intellectual power, the soul, unlike angels, receives 
p 
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its most perfect knowledge by abstracting from the phantasm which exists in 
a corporeal organ. The separated soul, while able to carry on its proper 
operation, which is to know, will gather its knowledge by turning to objects 
which are simply intelligible. This mode of knowledge is beyond, but not 
contrary to, the nature of the soul. Thus: 
• • .modus operandi uniuscujusque rei sequitur modum 
essendi, cum unitur corpori, et cum fuerit a corpora 
separata, manente tamen eadem animae natura ••• .Anima 
igitur secundum istum modum essendi quo corpori est 
unita, competit modus intelligendi per conversionem 
ad phantasmata oorporum ••• cum autem fuerit a corpore 
separata, competit ei modus intelligendi per conver-
sionem ad ea quae sunt intelligibilia simpliciter, 
sicut et aliis substantiis a corpore separatis. Unde 
modus intelligendi per conversionem ad phantasmata est 
animae naturalis, sicut et corpori uniri; sed esse 
separatam a corpore est praeter rationem suae naturae; 
et sin~lioiter intelligere sine conversione ad phantas-
mata est ei praeter naturam ••• 
~.Theol., I.q.89.a.l.,o. 
A second difficulty arises here. Since it is better to understand by 
turning to the simple intelligible objects, and since nature is always 
directed towards the better, why does not the soul understand naturally by 
this mode? This difficulty can be answered by considering that although in 
itself it is better to understand by turning to the simple intelligible ob-
jects, for the soul this mode of understanding is less noble. This is be-
cause the soul is the lowest of intellectual substances and the farthest 
from the Divine Light through which the intellective power exists. In its 
principle this light is one and simple, but the more the creature departs 
from its first principle, the more the light is broken up, just as with light 
p 
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rays diverging from the sun. God, by His one Essence, understands all; 
superior intellects understand through fgwer and more universal forms than 
do inferior intellects. This is because of the greater efficacy of the in• 
tellectual power in the superior intellects. The human soul, which is on 
the horizon of the spiritual and material worlds, has the least intellectual 
power, and consequently is the least capable of embracing more universal 
forms. The soul must then get its most perfect knowledge through forms less 
capable of embracing many objects, that is, through forms abstracted from 
individual material things. It follows then, that for the human soul, know-
ledge acquired through universal forms would be vague and confused. A simi-
lar case is seen among men of different intellectual ability. Those who 
have better intellects understand through more universal forms; while those 
who have inferior intellects, in order to have perfect knowledge, must have 
each particular explained to them • 
• • • in cognitivis aliquis qui est elevatioris intel-
lectus, ex paucis principiis penes se retentis habet 
in promptu procedere ad varias conclusiones, ad quas 
pervenire non possunt qui sunt hebetioris ingenii nisi 
per varias inductiones, et per principia particulariter 
coaptata conclusionibus. 
~·~·· q.s.a.lO.,c. 
St. Thomas states his argument thus: 
Considerandum est igitur quod etsi intelligere per 
conversionem ad superiora sit simpliciter nobilius 
quam intelligere per conversionem ad phantasmata; 
tamen ille modus intelligendi, prout erat possibilis 
animae, erat imperfectior. Quod sit patet: In 
omnibus enim substantiis intellectualibus invenitur 
virtus intellectiva per influentiam divini luminis; 
quod quidem in primo principia est unum et simplex; 
et quanto magis creaturae intellectuales distant a 
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primo principia, tanto magis dividitur illud lumen. 
et diversificatur, sicut accidit in lineis a centro 
egredientibus. Et inde est quod Deus per unam suam 
essentiam omnia intelligit. Superiores autem intel-
lectualium substantiarum etsi per plures for.mas 
intelligant, tamen intelligunt per pauciores et magis 
universales et virtuosiores ad comprehensionem rerum, 
propter efficaciam virtutis intellectivae quae est in 
eis. In inferioribus autem sunt formae plures, et 
minus universales, et minus efficaces ad comprehen-
sionem rerum, in quantum deficiunt a virtute intel-
lectiva superiorum. Si ergo inferiores substantiae 
haberent formas in illa universalitate in qua habent 
superiores, quia non sunt tantae efficaciae in intel-
ligendo, non acciperent per eas perfectam cognitionem 
de rebus, sed in quadam communitate et confusione ••• 
~.Theel., I.q.89.a.l.c. 
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Since the difficulty of the question concerning the knowledge of the 
separated soul arises from the very nature of the soul, in order to solve 
the problem it will be necessary to consider the doctrine of St. Thomas on 
the nature of the soul and its union with the body. It will then be clear 
that the human soul, although incomplete in itself and requiring to be united 
to the body, is yet a subsisting thing, and in virtue of this subsistence is 
capable of existing without the body. But for the intellectual soul, to 
exist is to know and will. Consequently, the separated soul will be able to 
understand without reference to objects existing in corporeal organs. Dif-
ficulties arise concerning the mode of operation proper to the separated 
soul, but st. Thomas offers a solution to these. 
p 
CHAPTER I 
In the doctrine of st. Thomas the human soul is an immaterial subsistent 
thing, the substantial for.m of the human body. It is the first principle of 
life·in the body and therefore it cannot itself be a body: for to be a 
principle of life does not belong to a body as such, otherwise every body 
would be a principle of life. That any body is a living thing or a principle 
of life or of activity is due to a first principle of life which is not it-
self a body, but the act of a body. The eye is a principle of activity, 
but it is so only in virtue of the soul and when the body is no longer ani-
mated by the soul, the eye loses its power • 
• • • anima dicitur esse primum principium vitae in his 
quae apud nos vivunt ••• YAnifestum est enim quod esse 
principium vitae, vel vivens, non convenit corpori ex 
hoc quod est corpus: alioquin omne corpus asset vivens, 
aut principium vitae. Convenit igitur alicui corpori 
quod sit vivens, vel etiam principium vitae per hoc quod 
est tale corpus. Quod autem est actu tale habet hoc ab 
aliquo principia, quod dicitur actus ejus. Anima igitur 
quae est primum principium vitae, non est corpus sed cor-
poris actus ••• 
~.Theol., I.q.,75.a.l.c. 
Further, since the human soul is the principle of intellectual life and has 
its own proper activity which is not the activity of an organ, it must be 
not only incorporeal but also something subsistent, as st. Thomas says: 
• • .necesse est dicere id quod est principium intel-
lectualis operationis, quod dioimus animam hominis, 
esse quoddam principium incorporeum et subsistens ••• 
~.Theol., I.q.75.a.2.o. 
9 
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At the same time it belongs to the very nature of the soul to be united to 
the body. 
• •• necesse est dicere, quod intellectus, qui est 
intellectualis operationis principium, sit humani cor-
poris forma. 
Sum.Theol., I.q.76.a.l.c. 
Concerning the question of the subsistence of the human soul st. Thomas 
takes a middle course between two extremes; on the one hand that the soul is 
not a subsistent thing, and on the other that the soul is a complete specific 
nature in itself. He has to meet the objection that the human soul is not 
subsistent and ~ particular thing, and that the term, ~ particular 
thing, can be said only of that which is composed of soul and body. Thus it 
is objected: 
Videtur quod anima humana non sit aliquid subsistens. 
Quod enim est subsistens, dicitur hoc aliquid. Anima 
autem non est hoc aliquid, sed compositum ex anima et 
corpore. Ergo anima non est aliquid subsistens. 
Sum.Theol., I.q.75.a.2.ob. 
- . 
The second opinion regarding the subsistence of the soul is that the soul is 
not only something subsistent but that it is in itself a complete specific 
nature. Plato is one St. Thomas has in mind as holding this opinion. Thus 
for both st. Thomas and Plato the soul is something subsistent, but the 
term, something subsistent, is not understood in the same sense by both 
philosophers. 
According to St. Thomas' interpretation, Plato holds that the soul is 
not only something subsistent, which St. Thomas also holds, but that it is a 
complete specific nature, which st. Thomas does not adrrdt. St. Thomas gives 
p 
the following as Plato's doctrine: 
••• posuit Plato quod anima humana non solum par sa 
subsistaret~ sad quod etiam haberet in se completam 
naturam speciai in anima esse~ dicens hominem non esse 
aliquid compositum ex anima at corpore, sed animam 
corpori advenientem. • • 
E!_ Anima, q.un.a.l. 
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In order to make clear his own stand on the question of the subsistence 
of the human soul st. Thomas distinguishes between the two senses in which 
the term, ~ particular thing, may be taken. In one sense anything that is 
not an accident or a material form can be called~ particular thing; while 
in the second sense only wholes are subsistent and those things which are 
parts of wholes are excluded. Thus, whiteness or the form of an apple cannot 
be called this particular thing in any sense, since neither has any existence 
apart from its subject. A hand can be called~ particular thing in the 
first sense but not in the second~ for a hand, even when separated from the 
body is a~ somethinR, yet it is but a part of the whole body. The soul 
likewise can be called this something in the first sense, but in the second 
only that which is composed of soul and body can be called ~ particular 
thing. 
• •• hoc aliquid potest accipi dupliciter, uno modo 
pro quocumque subsistente, alia modo pro subsis-
tente completo in natura alicujus speciai. Primo 
modo axcludit inhaerentiam accidantis, at formae 
materialis. Secondo modo excludit etiam imperfec-
tionem partis. Unde manus posset dioi hoc aliquid 
prima modo, sed non secunda modo; Sic igitur cum 
anima humana sit pars spaoiei humana, potest dici 
~ aliquid prima modo, quasi subsistans, sed non 
secunda modo: sic enim oompositum ex anima et 
corpore dicitur hoc aliquid. 
~.Theol., I.q.75.a.2 ad lum. 
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In another ?lace St. Thomas gives the following: 
• • .unde etiam nee hoc aliquid dici potest si per hoo 
aliquid intelligatur hypostasis vel persona, vel indi-
viduum in genera aut specie collocatum. Sed si hoo 
aliquid dioatur omne quod potest per se subsistere, sic 
anima est hoc aliquid. 
12 
E! Spiritua~ Creaturis, a.2.ad 16um. 
In refuting those who hold that the human soul is not something sub-
sistent St. Thomas first shows that the soul can neither be a body nor 
operate through a bodily organ, and that as the act of a body it must have 
an operation of its own, which operation belongs only to a self-subsisting 
thing. Since the soul is capable of knowing all material things, it oan have 
no matter in its own nature. This is because the presence of any matter in 
the soul would impede the lmowledge of all other things! just as to a man 
with fever all things taste bitter, being affected by the bitter humors of 
the tongue. Moreover, to know is not the act of any body. Since therefore 
the soul is an intellectual principle, it must have an operation in which 
the body has no part. Now in order to have an operation apart from the 
body, the soul must be something subsistent, as is clear from the following. 
• • .impossibile est quod intelligat per organum 
corporeum, quia natura determinata illius organi 
corporei prohiberet cognitionem omnium oorporum; 
sicut si aliquis determinatus color sit non solum 
in pupilla, sed etiam in vase vitreo, liquor infusus 
ejusdem coloris videtur. 
Ipsum igitur intellectuale prinoipium, quod dicitur 
mens, vel intelleotus, habet operationem per se, cui 
non oommunicat corpus. Nihil autem potest per sa 
operatari nisi quod per sa subsistit; non enim est 
operari nisi antis in actu. Unde eo modo aliquid 
operatur quo est; propter quod non dicimus quod 
calor calefacit, sed calidum. Relinquitur igitur 
13 
an~ humanam, quae dioitur intellectus, vel mens, 
esse aliquid incorporeum et subsistens. e 
~.Theol., I.q.75.a.2.c. 
st. Thomas opposes the opinion that the human soul is not only something 
subsistent but that it possesses in itself a complete specific nature. For 
the soul, he says, is that through which the body has life, and since life 
is the existence of living things, it follows that it is through the soul 
that the body has its existence as a human body. Now that through which 
anything has existence is its form, therefore, the soul is the form of the 
body. Because the soul is the form of the body, it is through the soul that 
the body gets its species, that is, its existence as a human body. But if 
the soul were in the body as a sailor in a ship, it could not give the body 
or the parts of the body their species. The presence of the sailor does 
not give existence to the ship, nor does his absence deprive the ship of 
its species. The ship is still a ship whether the sailor is in it or not, 
and the sails are sails whether the sailor is furling or spreading them or 
not. But when the soul has left the body, the body is no longer a human 
body except equivocally, nor is the eye in the dead body a human eye except 
in an equivocal sense. Besides in this case death, which is the separation 
of soul and body, would not result in the substantial corruption of any-
thing. Sailor and ship are still sailor and ship whether separated or not. 
Their union was accidental and their separation affects nothing substantial. 
Nothing remains then except to admit that the soul is a ~ something; not 
as if it had in itself a complete specific nature, but because as form of 
the body it perfects. the nature of man. And so it is both a form and a 
p 
this something. 
- Nanifestum est enim id quo vivit corpus, animam 
esse; vivere autem est esse viventium: anima igi-
tur est quo corpus humanum habet esse actu. Huius-
modi autem forma est. Est igitur anima humana cor-
poris forma. Item si anima asset in corpore, sicut 
nauta in navi, non daret speciem corpori, neque 
partibus eius; cuius contrarium apparet ex hoc quod 
recedente anima, singulae partes non retinent pris-
tinum nomen nisi aequivoce. Dicitur enim oculus 
mortui aequivoce oculus, sicut pictus, aut lapideus, 
et simile est de aliis partibus. Et praeterea si 
anima asset in corpore sicut nauta in navi, sequere-
tur quod unio animae et corporis asset accidentalis. 
Mors igitur, quae inducit eorum separationem, non 
asset corruptio substantialia; "quod patet esse 
falsum. Relinquitur igitur quod anima est hoc ali-
quid, ut per se subsistere, non quasi habens in se 
completam speciem, sed quasi perficiens speciem 
humanam ut forma corporis; et sic similiter est 
forma, et hoc aliquid. 
De Anima, q.un.a.l.c. 
14 
st. Thomas' stand on the question of the subsistence of the human soul 
might be summed up as follows: 
• • .anima humana non est hoc aliquid sicut substantia, 
oompletam speoiam habens, sed sicut pars habentis 
speoi«m oompletam, ut ex dictis patet. 
~Anima, q.un.a.l. ad 3um. 
Since the soul is the form of the body, it cannot be said that man is a soul 
making use of a body, nor that the soul is man. The soul itself is not a 
complete species, but is a part of the human species, and matter, the body, 
is the other part of the species. st. Thomas interprets Plato as holding 
that the soul is man, and that the soul makes use of the body as man makes 
use of clothes • 
• • • Plato posuit quod homo non sit aliquid compositum 
ex anima et corpore, sed quod ipsa anima utens corpore 
sit homo; sicut Petrus nan est aliquid compositum ax 
homine et indUmento. sed homo utens indumento. 
Sum.Cont.~ •• II.c.57. 
15 
In meeting this opinion St. Thomas points out the two ways in which the 
statement. ~ soul_!!~· may be taken. He says that while man is a soul 
yet any particular man. as Socrates, is not a soul only but is composed of 
soul and body. Taken in the strict sense. that man is man only as this 
iarticular ~· the soul cannot be called man. All natural things are made 
up of matter and form. Neither the matter nor the form P?ssesses in itself 
a complete specific nature, and in man neither the body nor the soul alone 
can be called man. This is evident since the nature of anything can be 
known by its proper operation, for whatever performs the operations proper 
to a thing is itself proper to that thing. If then man were a soul all the 
operations of a man could be attributed to the soul alone, without reference 
to the body. Now some of the operations proper to man, such as feeling, 
cannot be attributed to the soul alone, but to the compositum, as is said: 
••• quaedam potentiae oomparantur ad anima.m solam sicut 
ad subjectum, ut intellectus et voluntas ••• Quaedam 
vero potentiae sunt in conjuncto sicut in subjecto, 
sicut omnes potentiae sensitivae partis et nutritivae. 
~.Theol., I.q.77.a.8.c. 
It must then be admitted that the soul is not man, but what is composed of 
soul and body is man. 
• • .quod animrum esse hominem dupliciter potest intel-
ligi. Uno modo, quod homo sit anima, sed hie homo non 
sit anima. sed compositum ex anima et corpore, ••• Alio 
vero modo potest intelligi sic quod etiam haec anima 
sit hie homo; et hoc quidem sustinere posset, si poneretur 
quod animae sensitivae operatio asset ejus propria sine 
corpore: quia omnes operationes quae attribuuntur homini, 
convenirent soli animae. Illud autem est unaquaeque 
res quod operatur operationes illius rei; unde illud 
est homo quod operatur operationes hominis ••• sentire 
non est operatic animae tantum. Cum igitur sentire 
sit quaedam operatio hominis, licet non propria, 
manifestum est quod homo non est anima tantum, sed 
aliquid compositum ex anima et corpore. 
Plato vero ponens sentire esse proprium animae, 
ponere potuit quod homo asset anima utens corpore. 
Sum.Theol., I.q.75.a.4.c. 
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Since then the soul is not itself a complete specific nature but needs 
the body to complete it, and since matter exists for the sake of form, it 
is necessary·to seek in the soul itself the reason why it is united to the 
body. Ncrw the perfection of the soul consists in the knowledge of truth, 
which truth it attains through the intellect; but the soul is so constituted 
that it must be united to the body and thus receive knowledge of sensible 
things from the things themselves. Experience proves that the soul under-
stands by turning to the phantasms which are supplied by the body. Thus for 
its o~~ sake the soul must be united to the body. 
Ultima perfectio animae humanae cansistet in cognitione 
veritatis, quae est per intellectum. Ad hoc autem quod 
perficiatur anima in cognitione veritatis, indiget uniri 
corpori: quia intelligit per phantasmata, quae non sunt 
sine corpore. Ergo necesse est ut anima corpori uniatur 
ut forma, et sit hoc aliquid. 
E! Anima, q.un.a.l.c. 
The human soul is the lowest among the intellectual substances and is 
not naturally gifted with the knowledge of truth as are the angels; therefore 
the human intellect must gather its knowledge from material things. In 
order to do this the human soul must have not only the power of understanding 
but also the power of feeling. This power of feeling is exercised in the 
p_· --------------------------~ 
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action of the senses, and cannot be performed without a bodily organ. It is 
evident that a man deprived of one sense has no knowledge of the proper ob-
ject of that sense; for example, a man born blind has no idea of color. 
such wou~d not be the case were the soul able to understand without turning 
to the phantasm. It is clear then that the soul, for its own sake, must be 
united to a body that can serve as an organ of sense • 
• • • cum materia sit propter formam, at non e converso; 
ex parte animae oportet accipere rationem, quale debeat 
esse corpus cui unitur; ••• dioitur quod anima non solum 
est corporis forma et motor, sed etiam finis ••• manifestum 
(est) quod ideo naturale est animae humanae corpori uniri, 
quia cum sit infima in ordine rerum sensibilium; non habet 
anima humana intelligibiles species sibi naturaliter in-
ditas, quibus in operationem propriam exira possit, quae 
est intelligere, sicut habent superiores substantiae intel-
lectuales; sed est in potentia ad eas, cum sit sicut tabula 
rasa, in qua nihil est scriptum, ut dicitur ••• Unde oportet 
quod species intelligibiles a rebus exterioribus accipiat 
mediantibus potentiis sensitivis, quae sine corporeis or-
ganis operationes proprias habere non possunt. Unde at 
anima humana neoesse est corpori uniri. Si ergo propter hoc 
anima humana unibilis est corpori, quia indiget accipere 
species intelligibiles a rebus mediante sensu; necessarium 
est quod corpus, cui anima rationis unitur, tale sit ut 
possit esse aptissimum ad rapraesentandum intellectui 
species sensibiles, ex quibus in intellectu intel-
ligibiles species resultant ••• 
~Anima, q.un.a.s.c. 
It does not follow from this that the soul needs the body in the sense that 
it operates through a material organ, but rather, the body supplies the 
material with which the soul works • 
• • • corpus requiritur ad actionem intallectus, non 
sicut organum quo talis actio axarcaatur, sad ratione 
objecti; phantasmata anim comparatur ad intallactum sicut 
color ad visum. Sic autam indigare corpore non ramovet 
intallactum esse subsistentam; alioquin animal non asset 
aliquid subsistens, cum indigeat exterioribus sensibi-
~--------------~ 
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libus ad sentiendum. 
~.Theol., I.q.75.a.2. ad 3um. 
It is necessary then that the soul be united in some way to the body. 
Not can this union be an accidental one, for in that case man would not be 
one substantially, but only accidentally, and consequently neither under-
standing nor feeling could be attributed to man properly, for understanding 
is not proper to bodies, nor feeling to intellectual substances • 
• • • in nullo corpore est ni~i una forma substantialia: 
cujus est ratio triplex. Prima est, quia si plures, 
sequens non erit forma substantialis, quae facit esse 
~impliciter; sed solum accidentalis, quae facit hoc. 
Item, si sit acquisita forma substantialia, non erit 
generatio simpliciter. Ite~ quia non asset compositum 
ex anima et corpore unum simpliciter, sed duo simpli-
citer et unum per accidens. 
Quodl., a.7a.9. 
It remains, then, to consider the nature of this union. 
st. Thomas maintains that man is differentiated from other beings of 
the animal genus by his rationality, which he has in virtue of his intel-
lectual principle. Since difference is derived from form, it follows that 
the intellectual principle is the for.m of man. He says: 
••• unumquodque sortitur speciam per propriam formam. 
Sed homo est homo in quantum est rationalis. Ergo 
anima rationalis est propria forma hominis. 
E!, .Anima, q•un.a.l.c. 
And in another place: 
••• differentia sumitur a forma rei. Sed differentia 
constitutiva hominis est rationale, quod dicitur de 
homine ratione intellectivi principii. Intellectivum 
ergo principium est forma hominis. 
~.Theol., I.q.76.a.l.c. • 
,...-
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Moreover the soul is the first thing by which the body lives, because it is 
the first principle of all man's acts, as feeling, local motion, etc. Since 
anything acts in virtue of its form, the intellectual soul must be united to 
the body as its form. Thus: 
••• necesse est dicere, quod intellectus, qui est 
intellectualis operationis principium, sit humani 
corporis forma. Illud enim quo primo aliquid 
operatur, est forma ejus cui operatio attribuitur; 
sicut quo primo sanatur corpus, est sanitas, et 'quo 
primo scit anima, est scientia; unde sanitas est forma 
corporis, at scientia est forma quodammodo animae. Et 
hujus ratio est, quia nihil agit nisi secundum quod 
est actu. Unde quo aliquid est actu, eo agit. Mani-
festum est autem quod primum quo corpus vivit, est 
anima. Et cum vita manifestetur secundum diversas 
operationes in diversis gradibus viventium, id quo 
primo operamur unumquodque horum operum vitae, est 
anima. Anima enim est primum quo nutrimur, et sentimus, 
at movemur secundum locum, at similiter quo primo intel-
ligimus. Hoc ergo principiUm quo primo intelligimus, 
sive dicatur intellectus, sive anima intellectiva, est 
forma corporis ••• 
~.Theol., I.q.76.a.l.c. 
In this doctrine St. Thomas has to meet the objection that the human 
soul cannot be united to the body as form, for such a union would imply that 
the intellect has a determinate nautra, and would therefore be unable to 
know all things, which is contrary to the nature of the soul. Any power or 
faculty exercised through a corporeal organ is limited; as sight is exer-
cised through an organ, the eye, and the object of sight is necessarily 
limited to color. Moreover, any matter in the soul would impede the know-
ledge of all other things, as is the case when liquid placed in a colored 
glass appears to be colored. The objection is true in its conclusions, but 
~~· ----------------~ 
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it does not affect the question at hand. Although the soul is united to the 
body as form, this union does not affect the proper operation of the soul. 
The act of understanding itself, is in no way exercised through the body. 
st. Thomas says: 
• • .anima sit forma corporis secundum essentiam animae 
intellectualis, non taman secundum operationem intel-
lectualem. 
~Anima, q.un.a.9.c. 
While the soul requires the body and is united to it as form, yet the soul is 
not a purely material for.m, submersed in matter, as are non-intellectual 
forms. 
Non autem oportet substantiam intellectualem esse 
formam materialem, quamvis esse ejus sit in materia, 
• • .non enim est in materia siout materia immersa, 
vel a materia totaliter comprehensa, sed alio modo ••• 
~-~·~·· n.s9. 
st. Thomas answers the objection in the following manner: 
••• virtus intellectiva non est virtus alicujus organi 
corporalis, sicut virtus visiva est oculi: intelligere 
enim est actus qui non potest exercari per organum cor-
porale, sicut exercetur visio. Sed in materia est, in 
quantum ipsa anima, cujus est haec virtus, est corporis 
forma ••• 
Sufficit enim ad hoc quod homo possit intelligere 
omnia per intellectum, at ad hoc quod intellectus intelli-
gat omnia immaterialia, et universalia, quod virtus 
intellectiva non est corporis actus. 
~.Theol., I.q.75.a.l.adl. 
It might seem that as the human soul and body are not of the same genus the 
soul could not be united to the body as its form, the soul being in the 
genus of incorporeal substances and the body corporeal. It must be remem-
bered that rr~tter and form make up one thing; now if the soul is the form of 
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the body, the result will be one substantial thing, the composite,man. 
Neither the soul, although a subsistent thing, nor the body, is in itself a 
complete specific nature. Each requires the other; the body must be actu-
alized by the soul, and the soul, as form, must animate a body suited to it. 
Diversity of genus in no way impedes this union, and it is only in virtue 
of this union that one can speak of species or genus, for the soul gives to 
the body its species, and the body completes the specific nature of the soul • 
• • • necesse est, si anima forma corporis, quod animae 
et corporis sit unum esse commune, quod est esse compo-
siti. Nee hoc impeditur per hoc quod anima et corpus 
sint diversorum generum: nam neque anima neque corpus sunt 
in specie vel genera n~s~ per reductionem, sicut partes 
reducuntur ad speciem vel genus totius. 
~Anima, q.un.a.l.ad 13. 
Averroes attempted to explain the union of soul and body through the 
intelligible species, saying that as the intelligible species were in both 
the phantasm and the passive intellect, they served as a link between the 
body, in which the phantasm is, and the passive intellect, which is in the 
soul. Although it is true that the intelligible species are in both soul 
and body as was said, yet this cannot serve as the union between soul and 
body, for it does not explain how the act of the intellect would be the act 
of the man. This will be seen when one considers that phantasms are to the 
intellect what colors are to the sense of sight, proper objects. Now the 
species of phantasms are in the passive intellect as the species of color 
are in the sight. The colors, in~ges of which are in the sight, may be in a 
gle.ss window, but we cannot say that the window sees. The window in which 
the colors are is merely seen. It follows then that the phantasms which 
~-· --------------~ 
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are in corporeal organs may be known by the intellect, but it does not fol-
loW that man knows; rather, he or his phantasms are known, as the colors in 
the glass were seen. St. Thomas answers Averroes in the following manner: 
Hanc autem unionem Commentator • • • dicit esse per specie.m 
intelligibile.m; quae quidem habet duplex subjectum, unum 
scilicet intellectum possibilem, et aliud ipsa phantasmata, 
quae sunt in organis corporeis. Et sic per speciem intelli-
gibilem continuatur intellectus possibilis corpori hujus vel 
illius hominis. Sed ista continuatio vel unio non sufficit 
ad hoc quod actio intellectus sit actio Socratis. Et hoc 
patet per similitudinem in sensu, ex quo Aristoteles procedit 
ad considerandum ea quae sunt intellectus. Sic enim se 
habent phantasmata ad intellectum, ••• sicut colores ad visum. 
Sicut ergo species colorum sunt in visu, ita species phantas-
matum sunt in intellectu possibili. Patet autem quod ex hoc 
quod colores sunt in pariete, quorum similitudines sunt in 
visu, actio visus non attribuitur parieti; non enim dicimus, 
quod paries videat, sed magis quod videatur. Ex hoc ergo 
quod species phantasmata sunt in intellectu possibili, non 
sequitur quod Socrates, in quo sunt phantasmata, intelligat; 
sed quod ipse, vel ejus phantasmata intelligantur. 
~.Theel., I.q.76.a.l.c. 
St. Thomas has to meet the objection that the soul is not the form of 
the body, but is united to the body as motor. This objection can easily be 
answered. A motor does not confer species on the thing moved. If, then, 
the soul be united to the body as motor the soul would give motion to the 
body, but would not give it species; therefore the separation of soul and 
body would not result in the corruption of the body. But the parts of the 
body, eyes, hands, etc., are such actually only in virtue of the soul. The 
soul cannot be united to the body as motor only. 
:Mobile non sortitur speciem a suo motore. Si igitur 
anima non coniungitur corpori nisi sicut motor mobili, 
corpus, et partes eius non consequuntur species ab anima. 
Abeunte igitur anima, remanebit corpus, et partes eius-
dem speciei. Hoc autem est manifeste falsum: nam caro, 
r:-· --------------------~ 
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et os, et manus, et huius~modi partes, post abscessum animae 
non dicuntur nisi aequivoce, quum nulli harum partium propria 
operatio adsit, quae speciem consequitur. Non igitur unitur 
anima corpore solum sicut motor mobili ••• 
~·~·~·' II.c.57,3. 
Moreover the action of the motor can be attributed to the thing moved only 
as to an instrument, as the action of a carpenter to a saw. Understanding 
could than be attributed to Socrates only as to an instrument. This Dnplies 
that one understands through a corporeal instrument, which cannot be accepted. 
• • .actio motoria nunquam attribuitur moto nisi sicut 
instrumento, sicut actio carpentarii serrae. Si igitur 
intelligere attribuitur Socrati, quia est actio motoria 
ejus, sequitur quod attribuatur ei sicut instrumento: 
quod est contra Philosophum • • • qui vult quod intelli-
gere non sit per instrumentum corporeum. . 
~.Theol., I.q.76.a.l.ad 3um. 
Again, the essence of man is composed of matter and form. The intellect is 
not the matter, therefore unless it be the form it is outside the essence of 
man. Then the intellect would be to the man as motor to the thing moved. 
Now the act of the intellect remains in the agent and does not pass into 
something else, as the action of heat, for example, passes into the thing 
heated. The act of understanding could not be attributed to man simply by 
reason of his being moved by his intellect, any more than the action of the 
motor can be attributed to the thing moved • 
• • • cum Socrates sit quoddam individuum in natura, cujus 
essentia est una, composita ex materia et forma, si intel-
lectus non sit forma eius sequitur quod sit praeter es-
sentiam ejus; et sic intellectus comparabitur ad totum 
Socratem sicut motor ad motum. Intellegere autem est 
actio quiescens in agente, non autem transciens in alterum, 
sicut calefactio. Non ergo intellegere potest attribui 
Socrati propter hoc quod est motus ab intellectu. 
~.Theol., I.q.76.a.l. 
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If the intellect be united to Socrates as motor, that is, as a part of 
socrates in·the sense that a hand is a part, the action of the intellect can-
not be attributed to Socrates. Although we can attribute the action of a 
part to the whole, as the action of the eye to man, yet we cannot attribute 
the action of one part to any other part, strictly speaking. Thus, we do not 
say the hand sees because the eye sees. Therefore we cannot say Socrates 
understands because the intellect understands • 
• • • actio partis attribuitur toti, ut actio oculi 
homini; numquam tamen attribuitur alii parti, nisi 
forte per accidens; non enim dicimus, quod manus 
videat, propter hoc quod oculus videt. Si ergo ex 
intelleotu, et Socrate sit unum, actio intellectus 
non potest attribui Socrati. Si vera Socrates est 
tatum, quod componitur ex unione intellectus ad 
reliqua quae sunt Socrates, et tamen intellectus non 
unitur aliis quae aunt Socrates nisi sicut motor; 
sequitur quod Socrates non sit unum simpliciter, et 
per consequens nee ens simpliciter, sic enim aliquid 
est ens, quo modo et unum. 
~.Theol., I.q.76.a.l.c. 
St. Thomas holds that the intellectual principle is the form of man and 
for this reason man understands. The proper operation of man as man is to 
understand, and in this he surpasses all other animals. A being derives its 
species from its form, and since its form is the principle of operation, it 
f~llows that the intellectual soul is the form of the body. Among forms we 
find some more, some less, noble. The higher the form the less it is merged 
in matter and wholly compassed by it. The form of a plant surpasses that of 
a metal and has an operation above that of a metal. The form, or soul, of 
an animal is superior to that of a plant, and surpasses the purely vegetative 
soul in its power of operation. The human soul is the highest of forms and 
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is more excellent than matter, having a power and operation in which matter 
has nomare. This power is the intellect. 
Relinquitur ergo solus modus quem Aristoteles ponit ••• 
quod hie homo intelligit, quia principium intellectivum 
est forma ipsius. Sic ergo ex ipsa operatione intel-
lectus apparet quod intellectivum principium unitur 
corpori ut forma. 
Poteat etiam idem manifestari ex ratione speciei 
humanae. Natura enim uniuscujusque rei ex ejus opera-
tiona ostenditur. Propria autem operatic hominis, in · 
quantum est homo, est intelligere; per hanc enim omnia 
alia animalia transcendit ••• in hac operatione, sicut 
in propria hominis, ultimam felicitatem constituit. 
Oportet ergo quod homo secundum illud speciem sortiatur 
quod est hujus operationis principium. Sortitur autem 
unumquodque specie.m per per propriam formam. Relinquitur 
ergo quod intellectivum principium sit propria hominis 
forma. 
Sed considerandum est, quod quanta ••• forma est 
nobilior, tanto magis dominatur materiae corporali, et 
minus ei immergitur, et magis sua operatione, vel virtute 
excedi t eam; unde videmus quod forma mixti corporis habet 
aliam operationem, quae non causatur ex qualitatibus elemen-
taribus. Et quanto magis proceditur in nobilitate formarum, 
tanto magis invenitur virtus formae materiam elementarem 
excedere, sicut anima vegetabilis plus quam forma elemen-
taris, et anima sensibilia plus quam anima vegetabilis. 
Anima autem humana est ultima in nobilitata formarum. Unde 
in tantum sua virtute excedit materiam corporalem, quod 
habet aliquam operationem et virtutem in qua nullo modo 
communicat materia corporalis, et haec virtus dicitur 
intellectus. 
Sum.Theol., I.q.76.a.l.c. 
The objection has been raised that it is unfitting that the immaterial, 
intellectual soul be united to the material body as form, since matter is 
proportionate to the form • 
• • • non enim forma est propter materiam, sed materia 
propter formam. 
~ ~~ q.5.a.5.c. 
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To answer this difficulty it must be remembered that in the intellectual 
order the intellectual soul holds the same place that prime matter holds in 
the material order, that is, the lowest in its sphere. Prime matter is 
potentiality; it has a capacity to receive for.ms. The soul likewise is 
capable of receiving forms. Knowledge is a form of the soul, and the soul 
is not naturally gifted with species necessary-for its proper operation, 
which is to understand. The intellect is analagous to uninformed matter, or 
to a tablet on which nothing is written. In order to be informed the soul 
must abstract intelligible species from exterior things, which operation 
presupposes the action of the sensitive power. Now this sensitive power 
cannot exist without corporeal organs. Therefore, it is necessary for the 
immaterial soul to be united to a body most suited to its needs, that is, 
provided with various organs. st. Thomas makes this clear: 
Est • • • manifestum, quod ideo naturale est animae humanae 
corpori uniri, quia cum sit infima in ordine intellectualium 
substantiarum, sicut materia prima est infima in ordine 
rerum sensibilium; non habet anima humana intelligibilem 
species sibi naturaliter inditas, quibus in operationem 
propriam exira possit, quae est intelligere, sicut habent 
superiores substantiae intellectuales; sed est in potentia 
ad eas, cum sit sicut tabula rasa, in qua nihil est scrip-
tum ••• Unde oportet quod species intelligibiles a rebus 
exterioribus accipiat mediantibus potentiis sensitivis, 
quae sine corporeis organis operationes proprias habere 
non possunt. Unde et anima.m humanam necesse est corpori 
un1r1. Si ergo propter hoc anima humana unibilis est 
corpori, quia indiget accipere species intelligibiles a 
rebus mediante sensu; necessarium est quod corpus cui 
anima rationalis unitur, tale sit ut possit esse aptissi-
mum ad repraesentandum intellectui species sensibiles, ex 
quibus in intellectu intelligibiles species resultant. 
Sic ergo oportet corpus cui anima rationalis unitur, esse 
optima dispositum ad sentiendum. Sed cum plures sint 
sensus, unus taman est qui est fundamentum aliorum, scilicet 
tactus, in quo principaliter tota natura sensitiva con-
sistit •••• Cum igitur corpus cui anima rationalis 
unitur, debeat esse optima dispositum ad nature.m sens"i-
tivam necessarium est ut habeat convenientissimum organum 
sensus tactus ••• Corpus cui anima rationalis unitur, 
cum debeat esse convenientissimum ad sensum tactus, 
oportet quod sit maxima reductum ad medium per aequali-
tatem co.mplexionis. 
~Anima, q.un.a.s.c. 
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St. Thomas answers a second objection, that the intellectual soul, as 
the highest of forms, should not be united to a corruptible body. He re-
calls the definition of a soul, the first ~;;!_~natural organic body 
having~ potentially. 
• • .anima est actus primus corporis physici organici 
potentia vitam habentis. 
~.Theol., I.q.76.a.5.c. 
As act or form the soul must be united to a corporeal body. In any matter 
two conditions are to be found, one Which is chosen as suitable to a parti-
cular form, and another which is inherent in the matter itself. For example, 
a saw must be made of hard' matter in order that its proper function, cutting, 
may be carried on. Consequently, a workman chases iron as the most fitting 
material for a saw. Iron, by its nature, is subject to decay. That the 
iron will rust in no way implies that it is unsuitable material for a saw. 
Nowthe proper operation of the intellectual soul is to gather its knowledge 
from individual, material thin6s• In order to do this the soul must have 
not only the power of understanding, but also the power of feeling. Since 
feeling is proper to organic bodies capable of being animated, the soul must 
be united to such a body. All matter is by its nature subject to corruption. 
Thus the human soul should be united to the body because the body is poten-
~----------~ 
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tially sentient. The fact that the body is corruptible does not affect the 
suitability of such a union, any more than the corruptibility of the iron 
made it unsuitable material for a saw • 
• • • id quod consequitur materiam, dupliciter acc~p~ 
potest; uno modo secundum quod congruit formae; et hoc 
est quod agens eligit in materia: alio modo non secundum 
quod congruit formae, llmmO forte repugnat etiam formae et 
fini, sed est ex necessitate materiae; et talis conditio 
non est electa vel intenta ab agente; sicut artifex qui 
facit serram ad secandum, quaerit ferrum, quia est materia 
apta ad for.mam serrae et ad finem ejus propter suam duri-
tiem. Invenitur taman in ferro aliqua conditio secundum 
quam ferrUm non habet aptitudinem nee ad formam nee ad 
finem, sicut quod est frangibile vel contrahens rubiginem 
vel aliquid huiusmodi, quae sunt impeditiva finis; unde non 
sunt electa ab agente, sed magis ab agente repudiarentur, 
si asset possibile ••• Sic ergo homini est aliquid naturale 
secundum suam formam, ut intelligere, vella et alia hujus-
modi; aliqua vero sunt ei naturalia secundum suam materiam, 
quod est corpus. Corporis autem humani conditio dupliciter 
considerari potest; uno modo secundum aptitudinem ad formam; 
alio modo secundum id quod consequitur in ipso secundum 
necessitatem materiae tantum. Secundum aptitudinem quidem 
ad formam, necessarium est corpus humanum esse ex elementis 
compositum, et medie complexionatum. Cum enim anima humana 
sit intellectiva in potentia, unitur corpori ut per sensus 
accipiat species intelligibiles, quibus fit intelligens 
actu ••• Autem sequitur ex necessitate materiae quod sit 
corruptibile, secundum hanc conditionem non habet aptitu-
dinem ad formam, sed magis repugnantiam ad formam. Et 
quidem o.mnis corruptio cujuscumque rei naturalis, non 
est secundum convenientiam ad formam ••• 
~ 1~lo, q.5.a.5.c. 
CHAPTER II 
Since the soul is united to the body in order that it may carry on its 
proper operation naturally, it might be well to consider the mode of this 
operation before considering the soul's mode of operation when separated from 
the body. With regard to the objects of the soul's knowledge st. Thomas 
holds that the soul knows corporeal things which are beneath it, itself and 
the things contained in itself, and immaterial substances above it. With 
regard to the first group, material things, st. Thomas maintains that the 
soul knows them through the intellect. He thus opposes mere sensism, pheno-
menalism, and scepticism regarding the exterior world. 
Early philosophers knew only material things and held the material alone 
to be real. These philosophers, as Heraclitus and Empedocles, observing 
that bodies are in a state of perpetual flux taught that certain knowledge 
of their nature is impossible. One cannot know the nature of a thing that 
is perpetually changing. Plato, St. Thomas says, agreed that things of 
sense are constantly changing, but he wished to avoid the error that certi-
tude regarding the nature of things is impossible. In order to do this he 
built up his doctrine of ideas. While admitting the constant change in 
things he maintained that singular, sensible things are what they are in 
virtue of their participation in another genus of beings, separated fram 
matter and movement and consequently from change. These beings, separate 
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from material conditions, he called species or ideas. The soul, he taught, 
does not understand material things themselves, but rather, it understands 
the separate ideas or species of these things. For him the material world 
was unreal and not the object of true knowledge. St. Thomas rejects such a 
doctrine on the grounds that since the species or ideas are apart from time 
and motion, any knowledge of movement is excluded, and such knowledge is 
proper to physics. He likewise saysthat simply because one has a knowledge 
of the separate species or ideas it does not follow that one can form a 
judgement concerning sensible things. Plato's error was the result of his 
believing that the form of the thing known had necessarily to be in the 
knower and in the things known in the same manner or mode. He went beyond 
the earlier pl1ilosophers in recognizing the Dmnaterial, and observing the 
immateriality, universality and immobility of the form of the thing known as 
it is present in the intellect, he concluded that the things themselves 
must have an existence free from matter and change. This is not necessary 
however, for a thing received in a subject is present in that subject accord-
ing to the mode of the subject, not according to the mode of the thing re-
ceived. Even in sensible things this is seen, for, as St. Thomas points 
out, whiteness can be in one thing in a greater degree of intensity than in 
another, according to the capacity of the receiver. Likewise the form of a 
thing can be present in its subject under the conditions of materiality, 
changeability, and individuality. .The form of an apple is present in the 
apple under such conditions because of the nature of matter. But that same 
~-----------, 
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form is present in the intellect in a different mode because the intellect is 
imffiaterial. Thus: 
••• Forma autem hujusmodi potest considerari dupliciter: 
uno modo secundum esse quod habet in cognoscente; alio 
modo secundum respectum quem habet ad rem cujus est 
similitude. Secundum quidem primum respectum facit 
cognoscentem actu cognoscere; sed secundum respectum 
determinat cognitionem ad aliquod cognoscibile deter-
minatum. Et ideo modus cognoscendi rem aliquam, est 
secundum conditionem cognoscentis, in quo forma recipi-
tur secundum modum eius. Non autem oportet quod res 
cognita sit secundum modum cognoscentis, vel secundum 
modum illum quo forma, quae est cognoscendi principium, 
esse habet in cognoscente; unde nihil prohibet per 
formas quae in mente immaterialiter existunt, res 
materiales cognosci. 
De Ver. q.lO.a.4.c. 
st. Thomas refutes Plato's doctrine as follows: 
Videtur autem in hoc Plato deviare a veritate; quia 
c~~ aestimaret omnem cognitionem per modum alicujus 
similitudinis esse, credidit quod forma cogniti ex 
necessitate sit in cognoscente, eo modo quo est in 
cognito. Consideravit autem, quod forma rei intel-
lectae est in intellectu universaliter, et immateriali-
ter, et immobiliter; quod ex ipsa operatione intellectus 
apparet, qui intelligit universaliter, at per modum 
necessitatis cujusdam. Modus enim actionis est secun-
dum modum formae agentis. ~t ideo existimavit quod 
oporteret res intellectas hoc modo in seipsis subsistere, 
scilicet. immaterialiter et immobiliter. Hoc autem neces-
sarium non est; quia etiam in ipsis sensibilibus videmus, 
quod forma alio modo est in uno sensibilium quam in altero; 
puta cum in uno est albedo intensior, in alio remissior; et 
cum in uno est albedo cum dulcedine, in alio sine dulcedine. 
Et per hunc etiam modum forma sensibilia alio modo est in 
re, quae est extra animam, et alio modo in sensu, qui sus-
cipit formas sensibilium absque materia, sicut colorem 
auri sine auro. Et similiter intellectus species corporum, 
quae sunt materiales et mobiles, recipit immaterialiter et 
immobiliter secundum modum suum; nam receptum est in reci-
piente per modum recipientis. 
Dicendum est ergo quod anima per intellectum cog-
~-----______..., 
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noscit corpora cognitione immateriali, universali et 
necessaria. 
~.Theel., I.q.84.a.l.c. 
In maintining; that the soul knows material things through the intellect 
and not through its own essence, St. Thomas is opposing the crude application 
of the maxim: Like is known by like, as it is found in Empedocles. Em-
pedocles and the early philosophers taught that, as like is known by like, 
the soul, in order to know all material things, had to have the same nature 
common to all. Therefore, they taught that the soul is composed of the four 
elements and that it knows fire because it has fire in its make-up, earth 
because of earth and so on. All the soul's kn~rledge would thus be material 
and there would be no distinction between sense and intellect. 
st. Thomas points out that if the assertion, like is know.n by like, be 
taken in this· sense, and the soul knows fire because of the fire in its own 
make-up it follows that fire outside the soul should know fire, which is 
ridiculous. Moreover, it is not the matter, but the form, which makes a 
particular thing to be what it is. It would then be necessary that not the 
matter only, but also the form of each individual thing; be in the soul. Thus 
the soul would have to be not only earth, fire, etc., but also bones, flesh, 
and all things. This cannot be admitted. These early philosophers failed 
to distinguish between the material and the immaterial and between sense 
knowledge and intellectual knowledge. In the doctrine of St. Thomas materi-
ality and intellectuality are in inverse ratio. Thus things which are 
wholly material, immersed, as it were, in matter and entirely compassed by 
it, are incapable of receiving; any form but their own. A stone is a stone 
,, 
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and nothing more. \Vhile remaining a stone, it has no potentiality with 
regard to other forms and consequently can have no knowledge. Beings which 
are provided with senses are capable of receiving forms other than their own 
while they retain their own form, and consequently have sense knowledge. 
But because the senses operat~ through corporeal organs the objects of sense 
knowledge are necessarily limited. Vision is exercised through an organ, 
the eye; and the eye is capable of receiving only the for.m of color. More-
over, the senses receive forms materially, and not just subject to material 
conditions. The intellect on the other hand, is immaterial and because it 
does not operate through a material organ, it is not subject to the limita-
tionsthat affect the senses and consequently is capable of receiving the 
forms of all things. It is a capacity, a blank sheet on which anything is 
written. It is not limited by matter and receives the forms of things im-
materially, although subject to material conditions. st. Thomas agrees with 
the early philosophers that for the intellect to knav1 all things through its 
essence it would be necessary that all things be in its essence actually. 
He disagrees with their application of the doctrine. The intellectual soul 
does not actually contain the forms of all things. It is potentially all 
things in as much as it is capable of receiving the forms of all sensible 
things in virtue of the sense and of intelligible things in virtue of the 
intellect. It is proper to God alone that His Essence should comprise all 
things immaterially and He alone, therefore, understands all things through 
His Essence. 
rr=------------, 
Relinquitur ergo quod oportet materialia cognita in 
cognoscente existere, non materialiter, sed magis 
immaterialiter. Et hujus ratio est, quia actus cog-
nitionis se extendit ad ea quae sunt extra cognoscen-
tem. Cognosc~us enim etiam ea quae extra nos sunt. 
Per materiam autem determinatur forma rei ad aliquid 
unum. Unde manifestum est quod ratio cognitionis ex 
opposito sed habet ad rationemmaterialitis. Et ideo 
quae non recipiunt formas nisi materialiter, nullo modo 
sunt cognoscitiva, sicut plantae. • .Quanta autem aliquid 
immaterialius habet formam rei cognitae, tanto perfectus 
cognoscit. Unde et intellectus, qui abstrahit speciam 
non solum a materia, sed etiam a materialibus conditio-
nibus individuantibus, perfectius cognoscit quam sensus, 
qui accipit formam rei cognitae sine materia quidem, sed 
cum materialibus conditionibus. Et inter ipsos sensus 
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visus est magis cognoscitivus, quia est minus materialis ••• 
Et inter ipsos intellectus tanto quilibet est perfectior, 
quanta immaterialior. 
Ex his ergo patet quod si aliquis intellectus est 
qui per essentiam suam cognoscit omnia, oportet quod 
essentia ejus habeat in se immaterialiter omnia; sicut 
antiqui posuerunt essentiam animae actu componi ex prin-
cipiis omnium materialium, ut cognosceret omnia. Hoc 
autem est proprium Dei, ut ejus Essentia sit immateriali-
ter comprehensiva omnium, prout effectus virtute prae-
existunt in causa. Salus igitur Deus per essentiam suam 
omnia intelligit; non autem anima humana, neque etiam 
angelus. 
~.Theol~, I.q.84.a.2.c. 
The immaterial presence of the corporeal thing in the intellect is what 
St. Thomas calls the species. The question then arises, Vfuence is this 
species? Is it innate? If not, in what manner does the soul acquire it? 
St. Thomas rejects the doctrine that the soul knows through innate 
species. Just as the senses gather knowledge through sensible things, and 
the imagination receives its material from the senses, so the intellect gets 
its knowledge through the phantasm. This phantasm is not innate but is sup-
plied by means of the corporeal organs • 
• • • videtur esse tota philosophorum doctrina, quae 
sensus a sensibilibus, imaginationem a sensu, intel-
lectum a phantasmatibus accipere fatetur. 
Quodl., 8.q.2.a.3.c. 
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The objection has been raised that, since men and angels have under-
standing in common, the intellectual soul, like the separate substances 
should understand through innate species. st. Thomas answers, saying that 
while men and angels have understanding in common, men have not the same 
perfection of intelligence as the angels, just as lower grades of bodies, 
which merely exist, have not the same degree of perfection as higher bodies. 
Or again, just as a weaker eye is blinded by intense light in which a 
stronger eye sees clearly, so the intellectual soul would be blinded, as it 
were, by species proper to a higher intelligence. 
Plato held that man's intellect is filled with intelligible species, 
and that, man has forgotten his natural knowledge of all things because of 
his union with the body. St. Thomas refuses to accept such a doctrine on 
the grounds that, first, things naturally known are not forgotten, and 
secondly, that those deprived of the use of a sense are found to be without 
knowledge of the things that sense could perceive. The blind man has no 
idea of color. This would not be true if man had an innate idea of all 
things. 
• •• sed hoc non videtur convenienter dictum, primo 
quidem quia si habet anima naturalem notitiam omnium, 
non videtur esse possibile quod hujus naturalis noti-
tiae tantam oblivionem capiat, quod nesciat se hujus-
modi soientiam habere. Nullus enim homo obliviscitur 
~~--------
' 
ea quae naturaliter cognoscit, sicut quod omne totum 
sit majus sua parte, et alia hujusmodi. Praecipus 
autem hoc videtur esse inconveniens, si ponatur esse 
animae naturale corpori uniri, ••• Inconveniens enim 
est quod naturalis operatio alicujus rei totaliter 
impediatur per id quod est sibi secundum naturam. 
Secundo manifeste apparet hujus positionis falsitas 
ex hoc quod deficiente aliquo sensu, deficit soientia 
eorum quae apprehenduntur secundum illum sensum; sicut 
caecus natus nullam potest habere notitiam de coloribus; 
quod non asset, si intellectui animae essent naturaliter 
inditae omnium intelligibilium rationes. Et ideo dicen-
dum est quod anima non cognoscit corporalia per species 
naturaliter inditas. 
~.Theol., I.q.84.a.3.c. 
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Plato held that the forms of material things subsisted by themselves 
without matter, and are participated in both by our intellect, with the re-
sult that the intellect has knowledge of the thing participated in; and by 
corporeal matter to the effect of existence. According to St. Thomas' in-
terpretation, Plato likewise held that these participated ideas remain im-
movably in the soul, and it is these separate ideas, not sensible things, 
that cause our knowledge. The sensible objects merely rouse the soul to 
consider what it had knowledge of from the beginning. This doctrine makes 
learning to be a kind of remembering or recalling • 
• • • posuit Plato enim quod sensibilia non sunt dis-
ponentia animam ad recipiendum influentiam formarum, 
sed solum expergesoentia intellectum ad considerandum 
ea quorum scientiam habebat ab exteriori causatam. 
Ponebat enim quod a principio a formis separatis causa-
batur scientia in animabus nostris omnium scibilium; 
unde addiscere dixit esse quoddam reminisci. • • 
~.Cont.Gent., II.74. 
Plato, in trying to avoid the error that certitude is impossible, de-
Veloped a doctrine in which it is impossible to account for the union of soul 
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and body. If the soul knows by innate species, it has no need of turning to 
the phantasm, and consequently has no need of union with the body. St. 
Thomas rejects the doctrine on this very point, for it goes back to the idea 
that the union of soul and body is not for the good of the soul, but for the 
good of the body alone; form, that is, exists for the sake of matter. 
Unusquisque bene judicat quae cognoscit, et horum 
est optimus judex. • .Sed • • • per mentem ista 
inferiora judicantur. Ergo haec inferiora materi-
alia per mentem intelliguntur. 
Per sensum non cognoscimus nisi materialia. Sed 
cognitio mentis a sensu oritur. Ergo at mens naturales 
res cognoscit. 
~I.!:!:._·, q.lO.a.4.c. 
st. Thomas opposes any theory of innate ideas in the following passage: 
Sed secundum hanc positionem sufficiens ratio 
assignari non posset, quare anima nostra corpori 
uniretur. Non enim potest dici, quod anima intel-
lectiva corpori uniatur propter corpus; quia nee 
forma est propter materirun, nee motor propter 
mobile, sed potius e converso. Maxima autem 
videtur corpus esse necessarium animae intellecti-
vae ad ejus propriam operationem, quae est intel-
ligere; quia secundum esse suum a corpore non de-
pendet ••• Si autem dicatur, quod indiget anima 
nostra sensibus ad intelligendum, quibus quodam 
modo excitetur ad consideranda ea quorum species 
intelligibiles a principiis separatus recipit, hoc 
non videtur sufficere; quia hujusmodi excitatio non 
videtur necessaria animae, nisi in quantum est con-
sopita (secundum Platonicos) quodammodo, et ob~ 
liviosa propter unionem ad corpus; ·et sic sensus non 
proficerent animae intellectivae, nisi ad tollendum 
impedimentum quod animae provenit ex corporis unione. 
Sum.Theol., I.q.S4.a.4.c. 
He concludes: 
Unde dicendum est, quod species intelligibiles, quibus 
anima nostra intelligit, non effluunt a formis separatis. 
~.Theol., I.q.84.a.4.c. 
38 
st. Augustine, who was imbued with Platonic doctrines, took up this 
point of Plato's teaching, namely that the intelligible species by which our 
soul understands are derived from separate forms. He did not accept Plato's 
doctrine that the forms of things exist per ~, in a world apart. He sub-
stituted, as St. Thomas points out, the eternal types of all things exist-
ing in the Divine mind. 
Sunt namque ideae principales formae quaedam, vel 
rationes rerum ste_biles atque incoi!liilutabiles, quae 
ipsae formatae non sunt, ac per hoc aeternae ac sem-
per eodem modo sese habentes, quae in divina intelli-
gentia continentur. Et cum ipsae neque oriantur, 
neque intereant; secundum eas tamen formari dicitur 
omne quod oriri et interire potest, et omne quod 
oritur et interit. Anima vero negatur eas intueri 
posse, nisi rationalis, ea sui parte qua excellit, 
idest ipsa mente atque ratione, quasi quadam facie 
vel oculo suo interiore atque intelligibili. Et ea 
quidem ipsa rationalis anima non omnis et quaelibet, 
sed quae sancta et pura fuerit, haec asseritur illi 
~~s~oni esse ~aonea: id est, quae illum ipsum 
oculum quo ~dentur ista, sanum, et sincerum, et 
serenum, et similem his rebus quas videre intendit, 
habuerit. Quis autem religiosus et vera religione 
imbutus, quamvis nondum possit haec intueri, negare 
tamen audeat, imo non etiam profiteatur, omnia quae 
sunt, id est, quaecumque in suo genere propria quadam 
natura continentur, ut sint, ~Deo auctore esse pro-
creata, eoque auctore omnia quae vivunt vivere, atque 
universalem rerum incolumitatem, ordinemque ipsum 
quo ea quae mutantur, suos temporales cursus certo 
moderamine celebrant, sUI!liili Dei legibus contineri et 
gubernari? Quo constitute atque concesso, quis 
audeat dicere Deum irrationabiliter omnia condidisse? 
Quod si, recte dici vel credi non potest, restat ut 
omnia ratione sint condita. Nee eadem ratione homo, 
qua equus: hoc enim absurdum est existimare. Singu-
la igitur propriis sunt creata rationibus. Has autem 
rationes ubi arbitrandum est esse, nlsl ln ipsa mente 
Creatoris? Non enim extra se quidquam positum intuebatur, 
ut secundum id constitueret quod constituebat: nam hoc 
opinari sacrilegum est. Quod si hae rerum omnium 
creandarum creatarumve rationes in divina mente continent-
ur, neque in divina mente quidquaw. nisi aeternum atque 
incommutabile potest esse; atque has rerum rationes prin-
cipales appellat ideas Plato: non solum sunt ideae, sed 
ipsae verae sunt, quia aeternae .sunt, et ejusmodi atque 
incommutabiles manent; quarum participations fit ut sit 
quidquid est, quoquomodo est ••• 
De Diversis Quaestionibus, q.83.46. 
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Thus, while Plato held that wAtter becomes a stone by participating in 
the idea stone, and by participating in the same idea our intellect has 
knowledge of a stone, st. Augustine held that all things are made in accord-
ance with the eternal types existing in the mind of God, and the intellectual 
soul knows these things in the types. st. Thomas accepts the doctrine of 
st. Augustine, but he states clearly that it is not at all the same as 
Plato's theory. Plato apparently held that mere participation in the idea 
resulted in knO¥rledge, but St. Thomas holds that not only the intellectual 
light within us but.intelligible species derived from things themselves are 
required in order that we may have knowledge of material things. Just as 
in the physical order there must not only be light but there must also be. 
colored objects for the eye to see, so too in the intellectual order there 
must be intelligible species. 
The intellect knows material things, but there are two ~~ys in which 
one thing is said to be known in another. Firstly, a thing may be known in 
an object which is itself known. Thus in looking in a mirror one sees 
images of things reflected therein. The things are known through the mirror. 
l 
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In its present life the soul cannot know all things in the eternal types 
according to this mode. The reason is that in this life the soul does not 
see God in 11\fu.om the eternal types are. Secondly, one thing may be said to 
be known in another as in a principle of knowledge. In this sense one might 
say that we see in the sun what we see by the light of the sun. It is in 
this sense that the human soul knows all things in the eternal types. The 
intellectual light in us is a participated likeness of that uncreated light 
which contains the. eternal types. By our participated likeness in the 
Divine light all things are made known to us, but this intellectual light is 
not sufficient that we may know material things. There must also be the 
intelligible species derived from the things themsel vas. 1J'Jere the intellec-
tual light alone sufficient for a knowledge of material things man could 
know, without research and investigation, the natures of material things, 
their origin and development. Such is not the case. Therefore, although 
man knows material things in the eterne.l types, he does not know them without 
the intelligible species abstracted from the things themselves • 
• • • dicendum est quod aliquid in aliquo dicitur cognosci 
dupliciter. Uno modo sicut in objecto cognito, sicut 
aliquis videt in specula ea quorum imagines in specula 
resultant; et hoc modo anima in statu praesentis vitae 
non potest videre omnia in rationibus aeternis; sed sio 
in rationibus aeternis cognoscunt omnia beati, qui Deum 
vident, et omnia in ipso. 
Alio modo dicitur aliquid cognosci in aliquo sicut 
in cognitionis principia; sicut si dicamus quod in sole 
videntur ea quae videntur per solem; et sic necesse est 
dicere quod anima humana omnia cognoscat in rationibus 
aeternis, per quarum participationem omnia cognoscimus. 
Ipsum enim lumen intellectuale, quod est in nobis, nihil 
i 
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est aliud quam quaedam partioipata similitude luminis 
inoreati, in quo oontinentur rationes aeternae. 
Sum.Theol., I.q.84.a.5.c. 
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Since the intelligible species are required that we might have know-
ledge of material things, the question arises whether intellectual knowledge, 
too, is derived from sensible things. St. Thomas takes a middle course be-
tween the doctrine that all knowledge is caused by impressio~s made on the 
senses by sensible objects, and that which maintains that the intellect is 
in no way dependent on the senses or sensible things for its knowledge, but 
receives its knowledge solely from separate intelligible forms or ideas. 
Democritus, failing to distinguish between sense and intellect, held 
that all knowledge is effected by the impression made on the senses by sen-
sible things, that is, by a discharge of images. 
Democritus enim posuit quod nulla est alia causa cujus-
libet nostrae cognitionis, nisi cum ab his corporibus 
quae cogitamus, veniunt, atque intrant imagines in 
animas nostras, ••• Democritus posuit cognitionem 
fieri per idola et defluxiones • • .quia tam ipse 
Democritus • • • non ponebat intellectum differe a 
sensu. • • 
~.Theel., I.q.84.a.6.c. 
This leaves no place for intellectual knowledge and cannot be accepted. 
Although it is true that our knowledge originates in the senses yet it can 
go far beyond mere sense knowledge • 
• • • scientia nostra a sensu oritur. 
De~·· q.lO.a.6.c. 
Moreover, the immaterial could not affect the senses by a discharge of images 
yet knowledge of the immaterial is proper to man. Therefore, were Democritus' 
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opinion correct, natura would have failed to provide man with means of ac-
quiring the knowledge proper to him. This cannot be accepted. 
Natura nihil ••• deficit in necessariis. 
DeVer., q.lO.a.s. 
Plato held that the intellect is not dependent on the senses nor on 
sensible things, but rather, that it receives its knowledge from separate 
intelligible forms, or ideas. st. Thomas interprets him as holding that, 
not the sense, but only the sensible organs were affected by the sensible. 
According to Plato neither intellectual nor sensible knowledge proceed ex-
elusively from sensible things. The sensible things merely rouse the sensi-
ble soul to the sentient act, and the senses rouse the intellect to the act 
of understanding, without in any way causing the intellectual act. Thus the 
sensibles merely cause the soul to recollect, as it were, knowledge which it 
possessed previously, and which had been dulled or forgotten because of the 
union with the body. st. Thomas rejects this doctrine likewise because it 
makes the union of soul and body to be at least useless, and nature does 
nothing in vain. 
Natura nihil facit frustra ••• 
DeVer., q.lo.a.6. 
St. Thomas gives Plato's doctrine as follows: 
Plato • • • posuit intellectum differre a sensu, at 
intellectum quidem esse virtutem immaterialem organo 
corporeo non utentem in suo actu. Et quia incorporeum 
non potest immutari a corporeo, posuit quod cognitio 
intellectualis non fit per immutationam intellectus a 
sensibilibus, sed par participationem formarum intel-
ligibilium separatarum, • • .Sensum etiam posuit vir-
tutem quamdam per se operantem. Unde nee ipse sensus, 
cum sit quaedam vis spiritualis, immutatur a sansibili-
bus; sed organa sensuum a sensibilibus immutantur; 
ex qua immutatione anima quodammodo excitatur, ut in 
se species sensibilium format ••• Sic igitur secundum 
Platonis opinionem neque intellectualis cognitio a 
sensibili procedit, neque etiam sensibilia totaliter, 
a sensibilibus rebus; sed sensibilia excitant animam 
sensibilem ad sentiendum, et similiter sensus excitant 
animam intellectivam ad intelligendum. 
Sum.Theol., I.q.84.a.6.c. 
4:3 
Accepting in part both the doctrine of Democritus and Plato, St. Thomas 
agrees that the impression of the sensible on the sense causes the act of 
the sensitive part, not by a discharge from the sensible but by an operation 
of some sort. He agrees with Plato that the impression produced by the 
sensible does not suffice to cause the intellectual operation, something 
nobler being required. But St. Thomas does not accept Plato's doctrine that 
the intellectual operation is caused merely by participation in the ideas. 
For st. Thomas the nobler thing required is the acting intellect which makes 
the phantasm of the sensible thing intelligible in act by abstraction of 
the intelligible species. Intellectual knowledge is then caused partly by 
the senses, for it is through the senses that the phantasms are provided, 
and these are the material vnth which the intellect works. However, intel-
lectual knowledge is not caused wholly by sensitive knowledge and can far 
surpass sensible knowledge. Thus: 
Secundum hoc ergo ex parte phantasmatum intellectualis 
operatic a sensu causatur. Sed quia phantasmata non 
sufficiunt immutare intellectum possibilem, sed oportet 
quod fiant intelligibilia actu per intellectum agentem; 
non potest dici quod sensibilia cognitio sittotalis et 
perfecta causa intellectualis cognitionis, sed magis 
quodam modo est materia causae. 
~.Theol., I.q.84.a.6.c. 
And again: 
••• scientiam mentis nostrae partem ab intrinseco esse, 
partem ab extrinseco, non solum a rebus a materia sepa-
ratis, sed etiam ab ipsis sensibilibus. 
De~·· q.lO.a.6.c. 
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Since intellectual knowledge can surpass sensitive knowledge it might 
seem that the intellect can actually understand through the intelligible 
species without turning to the phantasms. St. Thomas holds, however, that 
there are two indications that the intellect, in order to understand actual-
ly, must turn to the phantasm. First, the intellect does not operate through 
a corporeal organ and therefore it would not be impeded or hindered in its 
act by the lesion of sorre bodily organ unless this act implies the operation 
of some power that does require a corporeal organ for its operation. In 
the case of lethargy a man is no longer able to understand things of which 
he formerly had knowledge. Memory requires the act of a corporeal organ, 
and the intellectual act obviously requires the memory since it is impeded 
in its operation when the memory fails. Now the phantasms of things known 
formerly are stored in the memory, so it follows that the intellect must 
turn to the phantasms in order to understand. Secondly, in attempting to 
understand something one makes use of examples from which he forms phantasms 
and thus examines, in a manner, the thing he desires to understand. More-
over, in order to understand incorporeal things of which there are no phan-
tasms, one compares them with sensible things from which phantasms can be 
formed. The reason for this is that the proper object of the human intel-
lect, which i9 united to the body, is a nature existing in individual, cor-
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poreal matter, as, for example, this stone or this horse. Now the intellect 
0annot directly apprehend the individual as such; this is done through the 
senses and imagination. Therefore the intellect must turn to the material 
representation of the individual, that is, to the phantasm, in order to per-
oeive the universal nature, stone or horse, existing in the individual. 
Plato, on the other hand, considered the proper object of the human intellect 
to be the natures of sensible things existing apart from material conditions. 
In his doctrine there was no need of the phantasm. 
• • .impossibile est intellectum nostrum secundum prae-
sentis vitae statum quo passibili corpori conjungitur, 
aliquid intelligere in actu, nisi convertendo se ad 
phantasmata ••• Hujus autem re.tio est quia potentia 
cognoscitiva proportionatur cognoscibili. Unde intel-
lectus Angeli, qui est totaliter a corpore separatus, 
objectum proprium est substantia intelligibilis a cor-
pore separata; et per hujusmodi intelligibile materi-
alia cognoscit. Intellectus autem humani, qui est 
conjunctus corpori, proprium objectum est quidditas 
sive natura in materia corpori existens; et per rerum 
aliqualem cognitionem ascendit. De ratione autem hujus 
naturae est quod in aliquo individuo existat, quod non 
est absque materia corporali; sicut de ratione naturae 
lapidis est quod sit in hoc lapide, et de ratione 
naturae equi est quod sit in hoc equo, et sic de aliis. 
Unde natura lapidis, vel cujuscumque materialis rei, 
cognosci non potest complete et vera, nisi secundum 
quod cognoscitur ut in particulari existens. Particu-
lars autem apprehendimus per sensum et imaginationem; 
et ideo necesse est ad hoc quod intellectus actu in-
telligat suum objectum proprium, quod convertat se ad 
phantasmata, ut speculetur naturam universalem in 
particulari existentem. Si autem proprium objectu, 
intellectus nostri esset forma separata, vel si formae 
rerum sensibilium subsisterent non in particularibus, 
secundum Platonicos, non oporteret quod intellectus 
noster semper intelligendo converteret se ad phantas-
mata. 
~.Theol., I.q.84.a.7.c. 
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Since the intellect must turn to the phantasm in order to understand, a 
suspension of the sensitive powers would hinder the judgment of the intel-
lect. To understand this it is only necessary to recall that the proper ob-
ject of the intellect is the nature of a sensible thing, as stone or horse, 
and in its present state vmatever the intellect understands it knows by com-
parison to sensible things, as was said. The intellect itself cannot direct-
ly apprehend the individual, sensible thing. It knows sensible things 
through the senses which do directly apprehend the material thing. Con-
sequently when the senses are suspended the intellect cannot know the nature 
of things and for this reason cannot form a perfect judgment of them. This 
is because the source of knowledge is out off from the intellect and not 
because the act of judgment is exercised through a corporeal organ • 
Thus: 
• • • judicium intelleotus non dependet a sensu hoc modo, 
quod actus iste intellectus per organum sensibile ex-
erceatur ••• 
De~-, q.l2.a.3.ad 3um. 
Uanifestum est autem quod non posset esse perfectum 
judicium fabri de cultello, si opus ignorare.t; et 
similiter non posset esse perfectum judicium scien-
tiae naturalis de rebus naturalibus, si sensibilia 
ignorarentur. Omnia autem quae in praesenti statu 
intelligimus, cognoscuntur a nobis per comparationem 
ad res sensibiles naturales. Unde impossibile est 
quod sit in nobis judicium intellectus perfectum cum 
ligamenta sensus, per quem res sensibiles cognoscimus. 
~.Theol., I.q.34.a.s.c. 
Since the phantasm is necessary in order that the intellect in its 
present state may acquire knowledge, the question arises, in what manner does 
the intellect make use of the phantasm? Does the intellect understand by 
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abstracting the intelligible species from the phantasm? If so, is this abs-
traction the work of the acting intellect? Again, is the species abstracted 
~at the intellect understands or that whereby it understands? 
For st. Thomas, intelligibility is in inverse ratio to materiality. 
only in so far as a thing can be abstracted from matter and material repre-
sentations or images can it be understood. 
• • .'sicut res sunt separabiles ~ materia, sic circa 
intellectum-sun~ Ergo oportet quod materialia in-
telligantur inquantum a materia abstrahuntur et a 
similitudinibus materialibus quae sunt phantasmata. 
~.Theel., I.q.85.a.l.c. 
Because the phantasm is a material representation of an object it cannot 
make an impression on the possible intellect, which is immaterial, and there-
fore it cannot be understood by the intellect. It is only when the acting 
intellect throws light on the phantasm and abstracts from it the intelligible 
species, free from conditions of materiality and individuality, that the 
possible intellect is informed or understands. The intellect can be informed 
only by an immaterial representation of an object, that is, by a form abs-
tracted from the phantasm representing an individual material thing. The 
reason for this is that the soul is united to a body and therefore has as its 
proper object a nature·existing in corporeal matter, and yet, because the 
intellect is immaterial and "like is known by like" the intellect can be im-
pressed or informed only by the immaterial. Therefore it is necessary that 
the proper object of the intellect be represented in an immaterial manner. 
The senses apprehend directly the material things and by means of the senses 
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the phantasm is produced. Thus the intellect understands a thing otherwise 
than it is, in the sense that the form of the thing known is present imrnateri 
ally in the intellect, While that same form is present materially in the 
thing known. However, since the intellect understands the thing known as it 
is in itself this mode of understanding implies no falsehood, as st. Thomas 
shows. He distinguishes between the two ways in which abstraction may 
occur, first, by composition or division; and second, by simple and absolute 
abstraction. According to the first mode we may understand that one thing 
does not exist in some other, or that it is separate from it. For the in-
tellect to abstract from one another things that are not really abstract 
from one another would imply falsehood. Thus to consider a triangle without 
three angles or to say that color does not exist in a colored object would 
be false. According to the second mode however the intellect may abstract 
things which are not really abstract from one another, without falsehood. 
Thus it is possible to consider color apart from a colored glass, since 
glass is not essential to color. Those things which belong to the species 
of a thing can be thought of apart from individualizing principles which do 
not belong to the notion of the species. One can, for example, consider man 
apart from the tall, white man, since tallness and whiteness do not belong 
to the notion of the species man. It is according to this second mode that 
the intelligible species is abstracted from the phantasm. The nature of the 
species, that is, is considered apart from those individual qualities repre-
sented by the phantasm. In speaking of the object of our knowledge and the 
intellect's mode of understanding St. Thomas says: 
And, 
••• Intellectus ••• humanus ••• non est actus ali-
cujus organi, sed taman est quaedam virtus animae, quae 
est forma corporis ••• Et ideo proprium ejus est cog-
noscere formam in materia quidem corporali individualiter 
existentem, non tamen prout est tali materia. Cognoscere 
vera id quod est in materia individuali, non prout est in 
tali materia, est abstrahere formam a materia individuali, 
quam repraesentant phantasmata. ~ ideo nocesse est 
dicere quod intellectus noster intelligit materialia 
abstrahendo a phantasmatibus; et per materialia sic con-
siderata in immaterialium aliqualem cognitionem de-
venimus. • • 
~.Theol., I.q.85.a.l.c. 
••• abstrahere contingit dupliciter: uno modo per modum 
compositionis et divisionis, sicut cum intelligimus ali-
quid non esse in alia, vel esse separatum ad eo. Alia 
modo per modum simplicitatis; sicut cum intelligimus 
unum, nihil considerando de alia. Abstrahere igitur per 
intellectum ea quae secundum rem non sunt abstracta, 
secundum primum modum abstrahendi, non est absque falsi-
tate. Sed secunda modo abstrahere per intellectum quae 
non sunt abstracta secundum rem, non habet falsitatem, 
ut in sensibus manifesto apparet ••• est enim absque 
falsitate ut alius sit modus intelligentis in intelligendo, 
quammodus rei in essendo; quia intellectum est in in-
telligente immaterialiter per modum intellectus, non 
autem materialiter per modum rei materialis. 
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~.Theel., I.q.85.a.l. ad lum. 
The intelligible species a~stracted from the phantasm is that whereby the in-
tellect understands rather than what it understands. It is through these 
species that the intellect is able to understand objects outside the soul. 
The intelligible species are ~o the intellect what the sensible species are 
to the senses. Now the sensible species are that whereby the senses per-
ceive an object. The sight sees by a likeness of the visible thing, yet it 
is not the likeness, but the exterior thing itself which is seen. So too 
the intelligible species are that whereby the intellect understands, rather 
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than that which is understood. Were these species that which and not rather 
that whereby the intellect understands there could be no science. This is 
because science is concerned with things outside the soul, and the intellect 
must be able actually to know these external things and not merely the in-
telligible species which exist only in the soul. 
Moreover a faculty can judge only of what it kncrv•s. If it knows only 
its ovm impression as such, it can judge only of that. Consequently if 
sight perceived only its own impression, one whose vision is faulty might 
perceive red to be brown, while one with good vision would perceive red as 
red. Since each judges according to what he perceives both opinions would 
be true. The same would hold for the intellect. It must be concluded that 
the sensible species is that whereby the sense perceives an exterior object 
and the intelligible species tl~t whereby the intellect understands. 
• • • phantasmata se habent ad intellectum nostrum sicut 
sensibilia ad sensum, ut colores, qui sunt extra animrum, 
ad visum; unde sicut species, quae est in sensu, abstrahi-
tur a rebus ipsis, et per eam cognitio sensus continuatur 
ad ipsas res sensibiles; ita intellectus noster abstrahit 
speciem a phantasmatibus, et per eam cognitio eius quodam-
modo ad phantasmata continuatur. Sed tamen tantum interest 
quod similitude quae est in sensu, abstrahitur a re ut ab 
obieoto cognosoibili, et ideo res ipsa per illam similitu-
dinem recte oognoscitur: similitude autem quae est in in-
tellectu, non abstrahitur a phantasmate sicut ab obiecto 
cognoscibili, sed sicut a medio cognitionis, per modum quo 
sensus noster accipit siwilitudinem rei quae est in 
speculo, dum fertur in eam non ut in rem quamdam, sed ut 
in similitudinem. Unde intellectus noster non directe ex 
specie quam suscipit, fertur ad cognoscendum phantasma, 
sed ad cognoscendum rem cujus est phantasma; sed taman 
per quandam reflexionem redit etiam in cognitionem ipsius 
phantasmatis, dum oonfiderat naturam actus sui, et speciei 
per quam intuetur, et eius a quo speciem abstrahit, scili-
cet phantasmatis; sicut per similitudinem quae est in visu 
a specula accepta, directe fertur visus in cognitionem 
rei speculatae; sed per quamdum reversionem fertur per 
eamdem in ipsam similitudinem quae est in specula. In-
quantum ergo intellectus noster per similitudinem quam 
accepit a phantaamate, reflectitur in ipsum phantasmata, 
a quo speciem abstrahit, quod est similitude particularis, 
habet quamdam cognitionem de singulari secundum continu-
ationem quarodam intellectus ad imaginationem. 
De Ver. q.2.a.6.c. 
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The object represented by the intelligible species is understood primarily, 
somewhat as a person looking into a mirror sees himself primarily and the 
mirror reflecting the image only secondarily. The intelligible species is 
itself understood but only secondarily. This is because a man is able to 
reflect upon himself and not only does he understand but can, as it were, 
see himself in the act of understanding and see also that 'whereby he under-
stands. By its act the intellect understands exterior things, the intelli-
gible species serving as the matter with which the intellect works. Now 
action may be of two kinds: one of which remains in the agent, as to hear 
or to knmv; the other passes fram the agent into an external object, as to 
heat or to saw. Every action proceeds from some form, and whether the act 
remain in the agent or passes from the agent into an external object, the 
form from which the act proceeds resembles the object. Thus heat passes 
into another and the heat in the heater is a likeness of the thing heated. 
So too, sight sees by the likeness of the visible thing, and the intellect is 
informed by the likeness of the thing understood, that is, by the intelli-
gible species. It thus knows things by means of the intelligible species. 
Et ideo dicendum est quod species intelligibiles se 
habet ad intellectum ut quo intelligit intellectus: 
quod sit patet. Cum enim sit duplex actio, ••• una 
quae manet in agente (ut videre et intelligere), et 
altera quae transit in rem exteriorem (ut calefacere 
et secare); utraque fit secundum aliquam formrum. Et 
sicut forma secundum qu~ provenit actio tendens in 
rem exteriorem, est similitude objecti actionis (ut 
calor calefacientis est similitude calefacti), simili-
ter forma secundum quam provenit actio manens in 
agente, est similitude objecti. Unde similitude rei 
visibilis est secundum qu~ visus videt; et similitude 
rei intellectae, quae est species intelligibilis, est 
forma secundum quam intellectus intelligit. Sed quia 
intellectus supra seipsum reflectitur, secundum eam-
dem reflexionem intelligit et suum intelligere, et 
speciem qua intelligit. Et sic species intellecta 
secundario est id quod intelligitur; sed id quod in-
telligitur primo, est res, cujus species intelligibilis 
est similitude ••• 
~.Theol., I.q.85.a.2.c. 
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Because the phantasm is necessary for the intellectual act in the soul's 
present state of union with the body, intellectual knowledge is in a way 
dependent on, since it arises from, sensible knowledge. Now with regard to 
both time and space sensible knowledge of the more common precedes knowledge 
of the less common. Thus a sound heard afar off is first perceived to be a 
noise, and as one approaches, to be a voice, then the voice of a man, until 
finally the words uttered are distinguished. Likewise, a child can dis-
tinguish man from not-man before he is able to distinguish this man from that 
man. Sensible knowledge proceeds from less to more perfect knowledge, and 
this indistinct knowledge is a state between mere potentiality for knowledge 
and complete knowledge. This same holds for intellectual knowledge as well 
as for sense knowledge. Thus the knowledge of the universal is first in our 
intellectual cognition. The reason for this is that the intellect proceeds 
from potentiality to actuality, from an incomplete act to a perfect one. 
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The incomplete act is indistinct, confused knowledge of a thing, while the 
perfect act is distinct, determinate knowledge of the object. Confused know-
ledge is knowledge of an object without knowledge of the parts contained in 
the object. To know these parts also, is to know the less common and consti-
tutes distinct knowledge. To know animal only as animal is to know it in-
distinctly; whereas to know rational or irrational animal, man or horse, is 
to know animal distinctly. It is thus the intellect knows the universal, 
or more common, before the singular and particular • 
• • • in cognitione nostri intellectus duo oportet con-
siderare. Primo quidem, quod cognitio intellectiva 
aliquo modo a sensitiva primordium sumit. Et quia 
sensus est singularium, intellectus autem universalium; 
necesse est quod cognitio singularium quoad nos prior 
sit quam universalium cognitio. Secundo oportet con-
siderare quod intellectus noster de potentia in actum 
procedit. Omne autam quod procedit de potentia in 
actum, prius pervenit ad actum incompletum, qui est 
medius inter potentiam et actum, quam ad actum per-
rectum. Actus autem perfectus ad quem pervenit in-
tellectus, est scientia completa, per quam distincte 
et determinate res cognoscuntur; actus autem incom-
pletus est scientia imperfecta, per quam sciuntur 
res indistincte sub quadam confusione ••• sensus exit 
de potentia in actum, sicut intellectus; idem etiam 
ordo cognitionis apparet in sensu. Nam prius secundum 
sensmn dijudicamus magis commune quam minus commune, 
et secundum locum et secundum tempus: secundum locum 
quidem, sicut cum aliquid videtur a remotis, prius 
deprehenditur esse corpus quam deprehendatur esse 
animal; et prius deprehenditur esse animal quam depre-
hendatur esse homo, et prius homo quam Socrates vel 
Plato; secundum tempus autem, quia puer a principia 
prius distinguit hominem a non homine, quam distinguat 
hunc hominem ab alio homine; et ideo pueri a principio 
appellant omnes viros patres, posterius autem determi-
nant unumquemqua ••• Et hujus ratio manifesta est, qu~a 
qui scit aliquid indistincte, adhuc est in potentia ut 
sciat distinctionis principium, sicut qui scit genus, 
est in potentia ut sciat differentiam. Et sic patet 
quod cognitio indistincta madia est inter potentiam 
et actum. 
Est ergo dicendum quod cognitio singularium est 
prior quoad nos quam cognitio universalium, sicut 
cognitio sensitiva, qu~ cognitio intellectiva. Sed 
tam secundum sensum quam secundum intellectum cog-
nitio magis communis est prior quam cognitio minus 
communis. 
~.Theol., I.q.85.a.3.c. 
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The human intellect, unlike the angelic or Divine intelligence, acquires 
knowledge by composition and division of the parts of the object known, pro-
ceeding from less to more perfect knowledge. The angelic and Divine intel-
lect have their perfection at once, and consequently have entire kn~vledge of 
a thing at once, by simply understanding the essence of the thing. The human 
intellect, resembling things which are generated and corruptible, passes from 
potentiality to actuality. Now intellectual knowledge originates in the 
senses, which perceive the accidents of a thing. The proper object of the 
intellect however is not the accidents, but the essence or quiddity, the 
substance of a thing. 
Proprium ••• obiectum intellectus est quod quid est, 
idest substantia rei ••• Igitur quicquid intellectus de 
aliqua re cognoscit, cognoscit per cognitionem sub-
stantiae illius rei: unde in qualibet demonstratione 
per quam innotescunt nobis propria accidentia, prin-
cipium accipimus quod quid est ••• Si autam substantiam 
alicuius rei intellectus cognoscat per accidentia, • • • 
quod accidentia magnam partem conferunt ·ad cognoscendum 
quod quid est; hoc est per accidens, inquantum cognitio 
intellectus oritur a sensu, et sic per sensibilium ac-
cidentium cognitionem oportet ad substantiae intellectum 
pervenire ••• 
~.Cont.~. III, 46. 
The intelligible species by which the intellect understands represents the 
object stripped of all its accidents and properties. The mental process of 
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separating the nature of the thing from its accidents necessarily implies 
differentiating and comparing. The human intellect first understands some-
thing about its object, as its nature, and later the properties and accide~ 
proceeding thus from one composition and division to another, reasoning 
until it arrives at complete knowledge. 
• • • cum enim intellectus humanus exeat de potentia 
in actum, similitudinem quamdam habet cum rebus 
generabilibus, quae non statim perfectionem suam habent, 
sed earn successive acquirunt. Et similiter intellectus 
humanus non statim in prima apprehensions capit per-
fectam rei cognitionem; sed primo apprehendit aliquid 
de ipsa, puta quidditatem ipsius rei, quae est primum et 
proprium objectum intellectus; et deinde intelligit 
proprietates et accidentia, et habitudines circumBtantes 
rei essentiam. Et secundum hoc necesse habet unum ap-
prehensum alii componere, et dividere, et ex una com-
positione et divisione ad aliam procedere; quod est ratio-
cinari. 
Sum.Theol., I.q.85.a.5.c. 
The object of the intellect is the quiddity of a natural thing. Now 
all natural things are composed of matter and form. The matter is the 
principle of individualization, but matter is repugnant to intelligibility, 
as was said. It seems evident then that the intellect knows the universal 
directly but that it cannot know the singular directly. 
• • • intellectus noster nunc cognoscit per species a 
rebus acceptas, quae sunt abstrahactae a materia, et 
omnibus materiae conditionibus; et ideo non potest cog-
nosc~ro singularia, quorum principium est materia, sed 
universalia tantum ••• 
~ Anima, q.u..'1.a.20. 
In abstracting the universal from the phantasm the mind leaves aside all the 
properties and accidents which make the object to be this particular man or 
horse. The intellect understands directly the universal form man, for 
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example, as man, not as Socrates or Plato. However were the intellect unable 
to go further and in some manner know also the matter which is intrinsic to 
the object, its knowledge would be inadequate. Although through the mental 
concept alone the intellect is unable to distinguish one particular man from 
another, yet by turning to the phantasm which is a representation of the 
singular the intellect is able to know, indirectly, the singular individual 
thing. 
• • • mens nostra singulare directe cognoscere non 
potest; sed directe cognoscitur a nobis singulare per 
virtutes sensitivas, quae recipiunt formas a rebus 
in organo corporali; et sic recipiunt eas sub determi-
natis dimensionibus, 3t secundum quod ducunt in cog-
nitionem materiae singularis. Sicut enim forma uni-
versalis ducit in cognitionem materiae universalis ita 
forma individualis ducit in cognitionem materiae sig-
natae, quae est individuationis principium. Sed taman 
mens per. accidens singularibus se immiscet, inquantum 
continuatur viribus sensitivis, quae circa particularia 
versantur. Quae quidem continuatio est dupliciter. 
Uno modo inquantum motus sensitivae partis terminatur 
ad mentem, sicut accidit in motu qui est a rebus ad 
animam; et sic mens singulars cognoscit per quamdam 
reflexionem, prout scilicet mens cognos9endo ob-
iectumsuum, quod est aliqua natura universalis, redit 
in oognitionem sui actus, et ulterius in speciem quae 
est actus sui principium, et ulterius in phantasmata 
a quo species est abstracta; at sic aliquam cognitionem 
de singulari accipit. Alio modo secundumquod motus qui 
est ab anima ad res, incipit a mente, et procedit in 
partem sensitivam, prout mens regit inferiores vires; et 
sic singularibus se immiscet movente ratione particulari, 
quae est potentia quaedam individualis quae alio nomine 
dicitur cogitativa, et habet determinatum organum, in 
corpore, ••• Universalem vero sententiam quam mens 
habet de operabilibus, non est possibile applicari ad 
particularem actum nisi per aliquam potentiam mediam 
apprehendentem singulare ••• 
DeVer., q.lO.a.5.c. 
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In order to understand things the mind is able to abstract from sensible 
tmages the likeness of external objects, and by means of the likeness to 
understand the objects themselves. Now the likeness by which the intellect 
understands is the form of the intellect. The intellect is also able to 
understand itself, but since it understands nothing without a sensible image, 
it is in understanding exterior things that it understands itself • 
• • • intellectus humanus etsi sa ipsum cognoscere possit, 
taman primum suae cognitionis initium ab extrinseco sumit: 
quia non est intelligere sine phantasmata. • • 
~·~·Gent., IV. 11. 
As the intellect cannot understand exterior things through its essence, so 
neither can it understand itself through itself. 
Impossibile est autem dici quod per sa ipsam intelligat 
de se quid est. 
~·~·~·• III. 46. 
The intellect can know only what is actual, as pure potentiality is unknow-
able. Thus the intellect cannot know primary matter, which is pure potency. 
It is only when the matter is informed that it becomes intelligible. The 
human intellect, as was said, is analagous to primary matter since it is a 
capacity for forms, and, like prime matter, until it is informed or made 
actual it is unknowable. Now it is through the intelligible species that 
the intellect is informed and becomes actual, and it is only then that it 
itself can be known to itself. Thus it is not through its essence, but 
through its act, that the intellect knows itself. 
That the intellectual soul does not know itself through its essence can 
be shown in several ways. Since all men have souls if the soul knew itself 
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through itself it would follow that all men would know the nature of their 
soul. But this is not the case. Likewise, if the soul were known to itself 
through its essence it would be naturally known. Now in those things which 
are known naturally, as the whole is greater than its parts, error is impos-
sible. There could then be no error regarding the nature of the soul. Yet 
there is error, so the intellectual soul does not know itself through its 
essence, but through its act._ 
Si anima per se ipsam cognoscit de sa quid est; omnis 
autem homo animam habet: omnis igitur homo cognoscit 
de anima quid est; quod patet esse falsum. 
Cognitio quae sit per aliquid naturaliter nobis 
inditum, est naturalis, sicut principia indemonstrabilia, 
quae cognoscuntur per lumen intellectus agentis. Si 
igitur nos de anima scimus quid est per ipsam animam, 
hoc erit naturaliter notum. In his autem quae naturali-
ter nota sunt, nullus potest errare: in cognitione enim 
principiorum indemonstrabilium nullus errat. Nullus 
igitur erraret circa animam quid est, si hoc anima per 
se ipsam cognosceret: quod patet esse falsum, quum 
multi opinati sint animam esse hoc, vel illud corpus, 
et aliqui numerum, vel harmoniam. Non igitur anima 
per se ipsam cognoscit de sa quid est. 
~·~·Gent., III. 46. 
The intellectual soul understands itself through its act and not through its 
essence. 
Intellectus autem humanus se habet in genera rerum in-
telligibilium ut ens in potentia tantum, sicut et 
materia prima se habet in genera rerum sensibilium, 
unde possibilis nominatur. Sic igitur in sua essentia 
consideratus se habet ut potentia intelligens. Unde 
ex seipso habet virtutem ut intelligat, non autem ut 
intelligatur, nisi secundum id quod fit actu ••• Sed 
quia connaturale est intellectui nostro secundum 
statum praesantis vitae quod ad materilia et sensibilia 
respiciat. • .consequens est ut sic seipsum intelligat 
intellectus noster, secundum quod fit actu per species 
a sensibilibus abstractas per lumen intellectus agentis, 
quod est actus ipsorum intelligibilium; et eis medi-
antibus intelligit intellectus possibilis. Non ergo 
per essentiam suam, sed per actum suum se cognoscit 
intellectus noster ••• 
~.Theol., I.q.87.a.l.c. 
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The intellect is superior to sense because it is capable not only of knowing 
other things, but of knowing itself also, and of distinguishing between it-
self and what it knows, between self and things outside self. The senses are 
capable of sense knowledge, but not of intellectual knowledge because they 
cannot reflect on self and perceive that they know. 
Est igitur supremus et perfectus gradus vitae qui est 
secundum intellectum, nam intellectus in seipsum re-
flectitur et seipsum intelligere potest. 
~·~·Gent., III. 11. 
It is because the intellect knows itself and thus is able to distinguish be-
tween itself and what it knows or what is not itself that it can have intel• 
lectual knowledge • 
• • • veritas est in intellectu, et in sensu, licet non 
eodam modo. In intellectu enim est sicut consequens 
actum intellectus, et sicut cognita per intellectum, 
consequitur namque intellectus operationem, secundum 
quod judicium intellectus est de re secundum quod est; 
cognoscitur autem ab intellectu quod intellectus 
reflectitur supra actum suum, non solum secundum quod 
cognoscit actum suum, sed secundum quod cognoscit 
proportionem ejus ad rem: quod quidem cognosci non 
potest nisi cognita natura ipsius actus, quae cognosci 
non potest, nisi cognoscitur natura principii activi, 
quod est ipse intellectus, in cuius natura est ut 
rebus conformetur: unde secundum hoc cognoscit veri-
tatem intellectus quod supra se ipsum reflectitur ••• 
~ ~· q.l.a.9.c. 
Since the intellectual soul, while united to the body, is able to under-
stand only by turning to phantasms it follows that immaterial substances, of 
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•hich there can be no material representation, cannot be understood by the 
intellect. The soul understands itself only indirectly and through its act 
as was said: 
Zx objecto enim cognoscit su~ operationem, per qu~ 
devenit ad cognitionem sui ipsius ••• 
E! Anima, q.un.a.3.ad 4. 
The reason for this inability of the soul to understand immaterial substances 
lies in the weakness of the soul's intellectual power, for in themselves the 
Lmmaterial substances are more intelligible than are material objects. The 
intellect in the presence of such substances is, as it were, blinded by the 
very intelligibility of such beings • 
• • • difficultas intelligendi res illas accidit ex 
nobis, non ex illis: nam intellectus noster se habet 
ad manifestissima rerum sicut se habet oculus vesper-
tilionis ad lucam Solis. 
The possible intellect in this life can be informed only by species abstract-
ed from phantasms, and since there can be no phantasm of a separated sub-
stance the intellectual soul cannot know such beings. 
Non est igitur intellectus possibilis in potentia n~s~ 
ad illa intelligibilia quae sunt facta per intellectum 
asentem. • .Cum ergo substantiae separatae non sint 
factae in actu per intellectum agentem, sed solum 
materialia; ad haec sola se extendit possibilis intel-
lectus. Non igitur per ipsum possimus intelligere 
substantias separatas. 
~·~·Gent., III. 45. 
However, since the intellectual soul is able to understand itself indirectly, 
and since it is itself an immaterial subsisting thing, it can by analogy 
have some inadequate knowledge of the separate substances. 
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Since the soul is unable to know separate substances either through it-
self or through its knowledge of material things, much less is it able to 
knOW God directly and as the First Object of its understanding. The reason 
is that no abstracted species can adequately represent either separate sub-
stances or God, and in the present life the soul cannot know things which 
are not thus represented. 
1ienti igitur nostrae in statu viae non potest convenire 
visio Dei per essentiam secundum primum modum. Mens 
enim nostra naturali cognitions phantasmata respicit 
quasi obiecta, a quibus species intelligibiles accipit •• 
• • unde omne quod intelligit secundum statum viae, in-
telligit per species a phantasmatibus abstractas. 
Nulla autem species huiusmodi sufficiens est ad repre-
sentandam divinam essentiam, vel etiam euiuscumque al-
terius essentiae separatae; cum quidditates rerum sensi-
bilium, quarum similitudines sunt intelligibiles species 
a phantasmatibus abstractae, sint alterius rationis ab 
essentiis substantiarum immaterialium creaturum, et 
multo magis ab essentia divina. Unde mens nostra natu-
rali cognitione, quam in statu viae experimur, nee 
Deum, nee Angelos per essentiam videre potest ••• 
E!~·· q.lO.a.ll.c. 
CHAPTER III 
Since the union of soul and body is natural to the soul and since while 
this union exists the human soul has a real, though extrinsic, dependence 
on the body a difficulty arises concerning the lcnowledge of the separated 
soul. If, so long as the soul is united to the body, the phantasms are 
necessary for the intellectual operation, can that operation be carried on 
when the phantasms no longer exist? 
The intellectual soul, the substantial form of the human body, is an 
immaterial subsisting thing, as was shown. Being immaterial it is conse-
quently incorruptible, for matter is the principle of disintegration • 
• • • anima humana omnino est immaterialis; quod patet 
ex hoc quod rerum species immatarialiter recipit. Ergo 
anima est incorruptibilis. 
~ P~ima, q.un.a.l4.c. 
When therefore, the material body is corrupted the soul will remain uncor-
rupted, separated from the body. This can be shown in several ways. 
A thing is received in another according to the mode of the recipient. 
Now forms of things are raceived in the possible intellect in as much as 
they are intelligible in act; and they are intelligible in act in so far as 
they are immaterial and universal and consequently incorruptible. The pos-
sible intellect is therefore incorruptible and since the possible intellect 
, is part of the human soul it follows that the human soul is incorruptible. 
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And again: 
Intelligibile est propria perfectio intellectus: unde 
intellectus in actu. et intelligibile in actu. sunt 
unum. Quod igitur convenit intelligibili 1 inquantum 
est intelligibile. oportet convenire intellectui in-
quantum, huiusmodi: quia perfectio, at perfectibile 
sunt unius generis. Intelligibile autem, inquantum est 
intelligibile, est necessarium. et incorruptibile: 
necessaria enim perfecte sunt intellectu cognoscibilia; 
contingentia vera, inquantum huiusmodi, non nisi defici-
enter, habetur enim de eis non scientia, sed opinio: 
unde et incorruptibilium intellectus scientiam habet, 
secundum quod sunt incorruptibilia, inquantum scilicet 
sunt universalia. Oportet igitur intellectum esse in-
corruptibilem. 
Unumquodque quod recipitur in aliquo, recipitur in eo 
secundum modum eius in quo est. Formae autem rerum 
recipiuntur in intellectu possibili, prout sunt intel-
ligibiles actu: sunt autem intelligibiles actu prout 
sunt immateriales, at universales, at per consequens 
incorruptibiles. .Ergo intellectus possibilis est in-
corruptibilis. Sed ••• intellectus possibilis est 
aliquid animae humanae. Est igitur anima humana in-
corruptibilis. 
II ~.Gent., 79. 
The acting intellect makes the intelligible to be intelligible in act, 
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which intelligible is incorruptible. In this act of abstracting the intelli-
gible the acting intellect is the agent and that which is rendered intelli-
gible in act is the patient. Since the agent is more noble than the patient, 
••• agens est honorabilius patiente ••• 
~.Theol., I.q.84.a.6.c. 
it follows that the human soul, of which the acting intellect is the light, 
is incorruptible. 
Faciens est honorabilius factu • • .sed intellectus agens 
facit actu intelligibilia. • .Quum igitur intelligibilia 
actu, inquantum huiusmodi, sint incorruptibilia, multo 
fortius intellectus agens erit incorruptibilis. Ergo at 
anima humana, cuius lumen est intellactus agens, ut ax 
praemiscis patet. 
II ~.Gent., 79. 
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The proper object of the intellect is the intelligible which is necessarily 
incorruptible, for things are intelligible and incorruptible in so far as 
they are immaterial. 
• • • sicut res sunt separabiles a materia, sic circa 
intellectum sunt. 
~.Theol., I.q.85.a.l.c. 
now the intellect actually understanding is one with the object actually 
understood. 
• • intellectum in actu est intellectus in actu, 
in quantum similitude rei intellectae est forma 
intellectus. 
~.Theol., I.q.85.a.2.ad 2um. 
Since the intelligible is the proper perfection of the intellect and per-
faction and perfectible are proportionate it follows that the intellect 
must be incorruptible. 
Proprium perfectivum hominis secundum animam, est 
aliquid incorruptibile propria enim operatic hominis, 
inquantum huiusmodi, est intelligere, per hanc enim 
differt a brutis, et plantis, et inanimatis: intel-
ligere enim est universalium, et incorruptibilium 
inquantum huiusmodi. Perfectiones aute.m oportet esse 
perfectibilibus proportionatas. Ergo anima humane. 
est incorruptibilis. 
II~·~·, 79. 
The human soul as was said is the form of the body. Now a form can be 
corrupted in three ways: through the action of its contrary, as heat is 
destroyed by the action of cold; or through the corruption of its subject, 
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as the pcrwer of vision is destroyed with the corruption of the eye; or 
through the defect of its cause, as light is lacking in the air when the 
6un, which is the cause of that light, is not present. The human soul can-
not be destroyed in any of these three ways. It cannot be destroyed through 
the action of its contrary for there is nothing qontrary to it, since~en 
contraries are not such as present in the soul • 
• • • owne quod corrumpitur habet contraria, vel est 
ex contrariis compositum. Sed anima humana est 
omnino absque contrarietate; quia illa etiam quae 
sunt contraria in se, in anima non sunt contraria; 
rationes enim contrariorum in anima contrariae non 
sunt. Ergo anima humana est incorruptibilis. 
~Anima, q.un.a.l4.c. 
Nor can the human soul be corrupted through the corruption of its subject, 
for the soul is a form not dependent on the body according to its being. 
Nor can it be destroyed through the defect of its cause, for the soul can 
have none but an eternal cause. Consequently the human soul is incorrupt-
ible. 
Similiter autem neque per corruptionem sui subjecti: ••• 
quod anima humana est forma non dependens a corpore 
secundum suum esse. Similiter autem neque per defici-
entiam suae ~ausae: quia non potest habere aliquam 
causam nisi aeternam. • .Nullo igitur modo anima 
humana corrumpi potest. 
II ~.Gent., 79. 
Similiter etiam anima intellectiva, cum habeat opera-
tionem vitae sine corpore, est subsistens, ••• et 
ita sibi debetur esse et fieri; et cum immaterialis 
substantia, non potest causari per generationem, sed 
solum per creationem a Deo. Ponere ergo anima intel-
lectivam a generante causari, nihil est aliud quam 
ponere earn non subsistentem, et per consequens cor-
rumpi earn cum corpore ••• 
~.Theol., I.q.ll8.a.2.c. 
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Moreover, the human soul, being a subsisting form has existence of itself 
independently of the body. In this it differs from accidents and purely 
material forms, which cannot exist apart from their subjects. Now existence 
follows upon form, and a thing exists in as much as it has a form. Thus the 
body informed by the soul is said to exist, and once it is deprived of its 
substantial form it cannot be said to exist as a human body. A subsisting 
form has existence of itself and whatever belongs to a thing in virtue of 
itself cannot be separated from it. Thus roundness belongs to a circle, 
and because of the very nature of a circle cannot be separated from it. If 
therefore a circle were a subsistent form it could not cease to be other 
than round. Since existence belongs to the soul in this way the substantial 
soul cannot cease to exist. 
Respondeo dicendum, quod necesse est omnino anL~ humana 
incorruptibilem esse. Ad cujus evidentiam considerandum 
est, quod id quod per se consequitur ad aliquid, non 
potast removeri ad eo; sicut ab homine non removetur 
quod sit animal; neque a numero quod sit par vel impar. 
Manifestum est autem quod esse per se consequitur formam: 
unumquodque enim habet esse secundum propriam formam; 
unde esse a forma nullo modo separari potest. Corrum-
puntur igitur composita ex materia at forma per hoc quod 
amittunt formam ad quam consequitur esse. Ipsa aute.m 
forma per se corrumpi non potest; sed per accidens 
corrupto composite oorrumpitur, in quantum deficit esse 
compositi quod est per formam; si forma sit talis quae 
non sit habens esse, sed sit solum quo compositum est. 
Si ergo sit aliqua forma quae sit habens esse, necesse 
est illam formam incorruptibilem esse. Non separatur 
esse ab aliquo habente esse, nisi per hoc quod separatur 
forma ab eo; unde si id quod habet esse, sit ipsa forma, 
impossibile est quod esse separatur ab eo. Manifestum 
est autem quod principium quo homo intelligit, est forma 
habens esse in se, et non solum sicut quo aliquid est ••• 
Relinquitur ergo quod principium intellectivum quo homo 
intelligit, sit forma habens esse; unde necesse est 
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quod sit incorruptibilis ••• 
~Anima, q.un.a.l4.c. 
It is in virtue of its being an immaterial substance that the human 
soul is both incorruptible and intellectual. Therefore the soul cannot 
cease to be, nor cease to be intellectual, even when separated from the 
body. Now a form which has no operation of its own apart from the matter it 
informs cannot exist apart from that matter. Thus heat or the form of an 
apple cannot exist apart from their subject. But the human soul is not such 
a form for even while united to the body it has an operation in which the 
body does not share, namely understanding. 
• • • in anima nostra sunt quaedam vires quarum opera-
tiones per organa corporea exercentur; et hujusmodi vires 
sunt actus quarumdam partium corporis ••• Quaedam vero 
vires anima nostrae sunt quarum operationes per organa 
corporea non exercantur, ut intellectus at voluntas; 
et hujusmodi non sunt actus aliquarum partium corporis. 
~.Theel., I.q.54.a.5.c. 
This power of understanding is the soul's highest and most proper operation 
and cannot be separated from the soul • 
• • • nulla substantia destituitur propria operatione. 
Sed propria operatic animae rationalis est inteliigere. 
Ergo post mortem anima intelligit. 
E!~·~ 19.a.l.c. 
St. Thomas answers the objection that since the human soul cannot 
understand without turning to the phantasms, the separated soul, having no 
such phantasms to which it can turn, will be unable to understand. The 
phantasms are necessary to the soul in union with the body because in that 
state the soul does not participate in the intelligible species as do 
separate substances, but must receive species abstracted from the phantasms. 
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soul is dependent on the phantaams for material with which to 
carry on its operation, but it is in no way dependent on the body in the 
exercise of this operation. Consequently the separated soul can understand 
if in some way it can be provided with intelligible species. Now while 
united to the body the soul understands itself, indirectly it is true, yet 
not through a phantasm of itself but through its act. Since the soul, 
whether present in the body or separated from it, will always be present to 
itself it ~~11 be able to understand if by some means it is actual • 
• • • mens ipsa sicut corporearum rerum notitias per 
sensus corporis colligit, sic rerum incorporearum 
per semetipsam. Sed ipsa semper sibi praesens erit. 
De~·· 19.a.l.c. 
The intellectual soul is unable to understand without the phantasm because 
its union with matter renders it passive. But anything which is passive 
because of its union with matter is rendered active by its separation from 
that matter. A form which can exist apart from the matter it informs is 
active ru1d not passive. Thus heat is both active and passive because of its 
union with matter. If however, it were possible for the form heat to exist 
thout matter it would be active and not passive. Therefore the separated 
longer united to the body and consequently no lon;er passive, 
11 be able to understand at least itself without receiving species from 
exterior objects, that is, abstracted species. 
Sicut aliquid ex coniunctione ad corpus materiale 
redditur passivum ita per separationem ab eadem 
redditur activum: calidum enim et agit, et patitur 
propter coniunctionem caloris ad materiam; si autem 
esset calor sine materia, ageret, et non pateretur. 
Ergo et anima per separationem a corpore redditur 
omnino activa. Sed quod potentiae animae non possunt 
per se ipsas cognoscere sine exterioribus obieotis. 
hoc eis competit inquantum sunt passivae ••• Ergo 
anima per separationem a corpore poterit per se ipsam 
intelligere, non accipiendo ab aliquibus obiectis. 
De~·· l9.a.l.c. 
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This is because the end of the intel~ective power is not to know the phan-
tasm, but rather, to know the intelligible species. Now although the proper 
end of a thing is always the same yet nothing prevents a thing from 
realizing its ena from different points in different modes or states of 
existence. Thus the proper end of the power of vision is to see color and 
of the power of hearing to hear sound. If then, color be wanting to the 
eye the proper operation of the power of sight cannot be carried on. Like-
wise, if sound be wanting the proper operation of the power of hearing can-
not be carried on. Now the phantasm is not the object of the intellect in 
the same ·way that color is the object of the power of sight. but rather the 
intellect, so long as the soul is united to the body, finds its proper ob-
ject in the phantasm. This object is the intelligible species. 
Manifestum est enim quod finis potentiae visivae est 
cognoscere colores; finis autem potentiae intellectiva 
non est cognoscere phantasmata. sed cognoscere species 
intelligibiles, quas apprehendit a phantasmatibus, 
et in phantasmatibus secundum statum praesentis vitae. 
Bst igitur similitudi quantum ad hoc ad quod aspicit 
utraque potentia, non autam quantum ad hoc in quod 
utriusque potentiae conditio terminatur. Nihil autem 
prohibet secundum diversos status ex diversis rem 
aliquam ad suum finem tenders. Finis taman proprius 
alicujus rei semper est unus. Et ideo licet visus 
nihil cognoscat absque colore: intellectus taman 
secundum aliquem statum potest cognoscere absque 
phantasmate, sed non absque specie intelligibili. 
Sum.Theol., III. q.ll.a.2. ad 1 
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NoW intelligible species may be divided into two classes. First are the 
of material things which exist in a more material way in the things 
knower, and are abstracted from things in order that they 
may be rendered intelligible. These are called abstracted species. 
secondly are those forms which exist in a more simple way in the things 
themselves than in the knower. These are called impressed species. 
Sciendum taman est, quod non semper species per quam 
aliquid cognoscitur, est abstracta are quae per ipsam 
cognoscitur; sed tunc solum quando cognoscens accipit 
speciem a re; et tunc haec species accepta, est sim-
plicitior et immaterialior in cognoscente quam in re 
quae cognoscitur. Si autem fuerit a contrario, scilicet 
quod res cognita immaterialior sit et simplicior quam 
cognoscens; tunc species rei cognitae in cognoscente 
non dicitur abstracta, sed impressa et influxa ••• 
~Anima, q.un.a.l7 .a.ad 4um. 
Thus the soul is naturally perfected in two ways, either by knowledge 
received from sensible things or by knowledge received from superior 
spiritual substances. Once the intelligible species through which the soul 
receives its most proper and distinct knowledge are no longer available 
because of the soul's separation from the body, the soul will be able to 
understand through the impressed species. Nor is this mode of understanding 
contrary to the nature of the soul even though it is above it, as was said. 
An indication that the separated soul will be able to understand \dth-
out the phantasm is found even in the soul's present state of existence. 
Thus, while united to the body the soul is better able to carry on its 
proper operation when withdrawn from excessive care of the body. The more 
a man is occupied with things of sense the less is he concerned about im-
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~terial things and the less apt is he for intellectual pursuits. It would 
seem that just as objects are the more intelligible as they exist in a more 
tmmaterial way, so too the intellect is more capable of understanding the 
more it withdraws from material cares and occupations • 
• • • anima, quanto abstrahitur a corporalibus, aptior 
redditur ad percipiendum influxum spiritualium sub-
stantiarum, et etiam ad percipiendum subtiles motus, 
qui ex impressionibus naturalium causarum in imagina-
tione humana relinquitur, a quibus percipiendis anima 
impeditur, cum fuerit circa sensibilia occupata. 
~.Theol., II II, q.l72.a.l.ad 1 
Likewise the intellectual operation can sometimes be carried on with an 
extraordinary independence of matter, as in dreams and ecstasy, when the 
senses are not acting. ~~en the intellect is not being provided with phan-
tasms through which it can receive intelligible species, and is, as it were, 
blank, it would seem to be subject to the influence of superior beings and 
to be informed by them. .Thus men sometimes can receive through the influenc 
of superior substances knowledge which surpasses the ordinary knowledge 
received through ab~tracted species. 
• • • anima quando impeditur ab occupatione circa corpus 
proprium, redditur debilior ad intelligendum aliqua 
altiora; unde et virtus temperantiae, quae a corporeis 
delectationibus retrahit animam, praecipue facit homines 
ad intelligendum aptos. Homines etiam dormientes, quando 
corporeis sensibus non utuntur, neo est aliqua perturnatio 
humorum, aut fumositatum impediens, percipiunt de futuuis 
ex superiorum impressions aliqua quae modum ratiocinationis 
humanae excedunt: et hoc multo magis accidit in syncopi-
zantibus, et extasim passis, quanto magis fit retractio a 
corporeis sensibus. 
Thus while united to the body the soul tends towards inferior things and 
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its knowledge from inferior things. But When freed from the body 
the soul tends towards superior things and likewise receives knowledge 
through their influence. 
Manifestum est enim quod anima humana corpori unita 
aspectum habet ex unione corporis ad inferiora directum; 
unde non perficitur nisi per ea quae ab inferioribus 
accipit, scilicet per species a phantasmatibus abstrac-
tas; unde neque in cognitionem sui ipsius neque in cog-
nitionem aliorum potest devenire, nisi in quantum ex 
praedictis speciebus manuducitur, ut supra dictum est. 
Sed quando jam anima erit a corpore separata, aspectus 
ejus non ordinabitur ad aliqua inferiora, ut ab eis 
accipiat; sed erit absolutus, patens a superioribus 
substantiis influentiam recipere sine inspections 
phantasmatatum ••• ; et per hujusmodi influentiam 
reducetur in actum. • • 
E! Anima, q.un.a.l7. 
This is because the intellectual soul is on the boundary of the corporeal 
and incorporeal worlds and as it is drawn towards the material it is with-
drawn from the consideration of the immaterial, while as it withdraws from 
the corporeal it mora nearly approaches the incorporeal and is more influ-
enced by separate substances. 
And again: 
Anima in sui separations a corpore, recipit influxum 
specierum intelligibilium a natura superiori, scilicet 
divina, secundum naturalem ordinem, quo experimur quod 
anima humana quanto magis a corporeis sensibus abstra-
hitur, magis potest esse particeps superioris influxus; 
sicut patet in dormientibus et alienatis, qui etiam 
quaedam futura praevident. 
Quodl., III, a.e.a.2l.c. 
••• anima humana sit in confinio corporum, et incor-
porearum substantiarum, quasi in horizonte existens 
aeternitatis, et temporis, recedens ad infima appro-
pinquat ad summum: unde et quando totaliter erit a 
corpore separata, perfecte assimilabitur substantiis 
separatis quantum.ad modum intelligendi, et uberius 
influentiam earum recipiet. Sic igitur etsi intel-
ligere nostrum secundum modum praesentis vitae, oor-
rupto corpore, corrumpatur, succedet tamen alius modus 
intelligendi altior. 
II ~.Gent., 81. 
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Thus in dreams one can receive knowledge concerning the future through the 
influence of separate substances. 
Utrumque autem melius potest fieri in dormientibus quam 
in vigilantibus, quia anima vigilantis est occupata circa 
exteriora sensibilia: unde minus potest recipere subtiles 
impressiones vel spiritualium substantiarum, vel etiam 
causarum naturalium. • • 
Sum.Theol.,II II; q.l72.a.l.c. 
If the soul united to the body can be thus influenced by separate substances 
it would seem that the separated soul, wholly unimpeded by the body, would 
be even more open to such influence. 
Uow the manner of the activity proper to a thing corresponds to the 
mode and nature of its substance. An intelligence subsisting apart is by 
itself, away from any body. Therefore its intellectual activity will be 
conversant with objects not based on anything corporeal. The soul's nature 
is not changed by its separation from the body, but its mode of existence is 
changed so its mode of operation will be different also. The separated soul 
will be a substance subsisting apart from matter and its intellectual activi 
ty will be like that of separate substances. 
• • • anima separata per suum intellectum recipit 
species intelligibiles per modum superioris sub-
stantiae ••• 
~Anima, q.un.a.20.ad 17um. 
________________ ......... 
Now in referring to the separate substances st. Thomas says: 
Modus operationis propriae alicuius rei proportionaliter 
respondet modo substantiae, et naturae ipsius. Sub-
stantia autem separata est intellectus per se existens, 
non in corpore aliquo. Operatic igitur intellectualis 
eius erit intelligibilium quae non sunt fundata in 
aliquo corpore. Omnia autem intelligibilia a sensibili-
bus accepta, sunt in aliquibus corporibus aliqualiter 
fundata, sicut intelligibilia nostra in phantasmatibus, 
quae sunt in organic corporeis. Substantiae igitur 
separatae non accipiunt cognitionem ex sensibilibus. 
II ~·~·• 96. 
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Because inferior things are not ordered to inferiors the separated soul will 
no longer be ordered to material representations in carrying on its proper 
operation. It will understand in a way suitable to its mode of existence, 
that is, by turning to participated species, sharing with sep~rate sub-
stances the influence of the Divine Light. However our intellect stands in 
such pressing need of particular detailed likenesses that for every distinct 
object of knowledge it requires a distinct likeness in itself. It knows 
each different specific nature by a different intelligible species. Thus 
through the more universal idea "animal" the soul has only an indistinct 
idea of "rational" and "irrational." Therefore because of its weakness the 
soul is provided with two powers, sense and intellect, in order that it may 
know what superior intellects know by a single power, intellect. 
Intellectus autem noster, quia infimum gradum tenet in 
substantiis intellectualibus, adeo particulatas simili-
tudines requirit quod unicuique cognoscibili proprio 
oportet respondere propriam similitudinem in ipso: 
unde per similitudinem animalis non cognoscit rationale, 
et per consequens nee hominem, nisi secundum quid. 
Similitude autem intelligibilis, quae est in substantia 
separata, est universalioris virtutis ad plura reprae-
sentanda sufficiens; et ideo non facit imperfectiorem 
cognitionem, sed perfectiorem: est enim universalis 
virtus ad modum formae agentis in causa universali, 
quae quanta fuerit universalior, tanto ad plura se 
extendit, et efficacius producit. Per sirrdlitudinem 
igitur unam cognoscit et animal, at differentias 
animalis, aut etiam· universaliori modo, et contrac-
tiori secundum ordinem substantiarum praedictarum. 
II ~·~·• 98. 
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Although the knowledge of the separate substances is not proportionate to 
the intellectual soul it does not follow that the soul can have no knowledge 
from the influx of these substances, but only that this knowledge will be 
confused and imperfect. 
And: 
• • • anima separata per suum intellectum recipit species 
intelligibiles per modum superioris substantiae, in qua 
virtute cognoscitur quod homo duabus virtutibus, scilicet 
sensu at intellectu, cognoscit. 
_£::Anima, q.un.a.20. ad 17um. 
• • • quod ex hoc quod scientia substantiarum separatarum 
non est proportionate. animae nostrae, non sequitur quod 
nullwm intelligentiam ex earum influxu capera possit; 
sed solum quod non possit capere perfectam at distinctam ••• 
.£!Anima, q.un.a.l5. ad 2lum. 
Because the soul is the lowest of the intellectual substances this mode of 
understanding is not natural to it simply but only in so far as the soul is 
separated, and it will receive the emanation of the intelligible light in 
the lowest mode. This corresponds to understanding the phantasm made in-
telligible in act. 
Raec autem cognitio, ut cognoscat praedicto modo sub-
stantias separatas, est sibi naturalis, non simpliciter, 
sed in quantum est unita, non competit sibi • 
.£!.Anima, q.un.a.l7. ad 2um. 
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Since independence of matter me~es a thing to be a proper tena of in-
tellect it cannot be that the different mode of understanding follows from 
the difference in intelligible species; but rather, the difference comes 
from the mode of existence of the separated soul, because operation follows 
from mode of existence. Thus the intellectual operation is not diversified 
by the intelligible species, whether these species are recieved from the 
phantasms or fro.m some other thing • 
• • • diversus modus intelligendi non provenit ex diversi-
tate specierum, sed ex diverse statu animae intelligentis. 
Sum.Theol., I. q.89.a.6.ad 2um • 
• • • operatic propria animae est intelligere intelli-
gibilia actu. Nee per hoc diversificatur species in-
tellectualis operationis, quod intelligibilia actu 
sunt accepta a phantasmatibus vel aliunde. 
De Anima, q.un.a.l5.ad lOum. 
Moreover, to view a thing intellectually belongs to the potential intellect 
which forms the mental concept from the intelligible species and thus under-
stands. 
Intellectus enim possibilis est in actu perfecto 
secundum species intelligibiles, cum considerat actu ••• 
II ~.Gent., 74. 
Since this intellect is in potentiality to universal being it can be in-
formed by intelligible species, whether abstracted or impressed, and thus 
:made actual. 
~nile united to the body the soul has one mode of understanding, by 
turning to the phantasm. Separated from the body it will be able to under-
stand by means of impressed species, 
• • • anima, cum est corpori unita, si haberet species 
innatas, per eas posset intelligere, sicut intelligit 
per acquisitas. Sed licet sit perfectior in natura sua 
taman propter motus sues corporeos at occupationes 
sensibiles retinetur ut non possit ita libere conjungi 
substantiis superioribus ad recipiendum influxum earum, 
sicut post separationem. 
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~Anima, q.un.a.l5. ad 13um. 
nor will this be the only mode by which the soul will understand. Since the 
knowledge acquired in union with the body is not destroyed by death the 
soul will be able to know what it formerly knew, to know that is, through 
species which it received while united to the body. Likewise the soul will 
see the separate substances and thus both know them and the species of 
things in them. Thus the separated soul will know by three modes. 
Ex quibus colligi potest quod anima post mortem tribus 
modis intelligit: uno modo per species quas recipit a 
rebus dum erat in corpore; alia modp per species in ipsa 
sua separations a corpore sibi divinitus infusas; tertio 
modo videndo substantias separatas, et in eis species 
rerum intuendo. • • 
~ ~·, l9.a.l. 
The soul will be able to understand through species fo~erly received 
in the body. 
Habebunt etiam animae separatae determinatam cognitionem 
eorum quae prius hie sciverunt, quorum species intelli-
gibiles conservantur in eis. 
E! Anima, q.un.a.l5.c. 
Since knowledge resides in the intellect, which is incorruptible, it cannot 
be corrupted through the corruption of its subject. Nor can knowledge be 
corrupted through its contrary, for there is nothing contrary to the meaning 
of intelligible things. Since forgetfulness has no place in the separated 
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soul knowledge formerly acquired cannot be destroyed in this way. Nor can 
the knowledge in the separated soul be destroyed through a false argument. 
Manifestum est autem quod per corruptionem subjeoti 
scientia quae est L~ intellectu humano, corrumpi non 
potest; cum intellectus sit incorruptibilis, ••• 
Similiter etiam nee per contrarium corrumpi possunt 
species intelligibiles quae sunt in intellectu possi-
bili; quia intentioni intelligibilium nihil est 
contrarium, et praecipue quantum ad simplicem intelli-
gentiam, qua intelligitur quod quid est. Sed quantum 
ad operationem qua intelleetUScomponit et dividit, vel 
etiam ratiocinatur, sic invenitur contrarietas in in-
tellectu, secundum quod falsum in propositione, vel 
argumentations est contrarium vero. Et hoc modo inter-
dum scientia corrumpitur per contrarium, dum scilicet 
aliquis per falsam argumentationem abducitur a scientia 
veritatis ••• Sed hoc non habet locum in anima separata. 
Unde dicendum est quod habitus scientiae secundum quod 
est in intellectu, manet in anima separata. 
~.Theol., I.q.89.a.5. 
This knowledge alone however would not suffice: 
••• anima post mortem intelligit per aliquas species. 
Potest quidem intelligere per species quas in corpore 
acquisivit, quamvis illae usquequaque non sufficiant ••• 
_E! !!!:·• 19.a.l.ad lOum. 
The soul would be unable to know any more than it knew on earth were it 
limited to species acquired here, and the souls of children would have no 
knowledge, neither of which can be admitted. Nmv since understanding can-
not be accomplished without a certain receiving of impressions the separated 
soul will be dependent on impressions received from separate substances, 
and because the soul existing apart from the body is itself a separate sub-
stance this mode of understanding is fitting. 
Actus autem proportionatur ei cujus est actus. 
~.Theol., I.q.l2.a.3.c. 
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A thing can be natural according to one mode of existence and not natural 
according to another. Thus water in a solid state, ice, does not tend to 
rise, while water existing in the form of steam does tend to rise. Like-
wise, what is not possible to the soul in one state of existence is possible 
to it in another, and its mode of knowledge differs according to its mode 
of existence. 
Uni enim at eidem rei est aliquid contra naturam, et 
secundum naturam secundum eius status diversos, eo 
quod non est eadem natura rei dum est in fieri, et 
dum est in perfecto esse. • .sicut quantitas completa 
est naturalis homini cum ad perfectam pervenerit 
aetatem, asset autem contra naturam puero, si in 
perfecta quantitate nascereretur ••• 
~·~·· 13.a.l.ad lum. 
Since the soul is a separate substance and like is known by like it will 
know separate substances. 
• • .Similitude est causa cognitionis. 
~!!::.·• q.8.a.7.c. 
The soul is intelligent because it has a passive capacity for all being. 
The more material a thing is the less capable is it of having knowledge. 
Thus things which merely exist, as a stone, can have no knowledge for they 
cannot receive another form while retaining their own. Sentient things are 
capable of receiving some forms while remaining themselves and are thus 
capable of some knowledge. The human intellect, being immaterial, is able 
to receive the forms of all things, to know all things. 
Inter parfectiqnes autem rerum potissima est quod aliquid 
sit intellectivum: nam per hoc ipsum est quodammodo 
omnia, habens in se omnium perfeotiones ••• 
I Cont.~., 44. 
• 
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consequently the object of the intellect, whether in the body or separated 
therefrom, is reality; its function is to grasp reality. 
Proprium autem obiectum intellectus est quod quid est. 
II~·~·· 56. 
Naturae autem intellectuales maiorem habent affinitatam 
ad totum quam aliae naturae: nam unaquaeque intellect-
ualis substantia est quodammodo omnia, inquantum totius 
entis comprehensiva est suo intellectu ••• 
III Cont .Gent., 112. 
Even while united to the body the soul's knowledge extends to whatever is 
subject to the light of the active intellect, namely the natures of material 
things. lJow in this life the soul is aided by the body, but it is at the 
same time enveloped by the body and prevented from receiving the influence 
of separate substances. Since the soul's nature is not changed by its 
separation from the body the object of its knmvledge will be all being and 
it 'rill be more capable of receiving knowledge of all being in the universal 
Est autem aliud genus potentiarum animae quod respicit 
adhuc universalius objectum, scilicet non solum corpus 
sensibile, sed etiam universaliter omne ens. 
Sum.Theol., I.q.S7.a.l. 
Being separated from the body the soul's intellectual activity will be con-
versant with objects not based on anything corporeal, 
••• substantiae separatae non accipiunt intellectivam 
cognitionem ex rebus sensibilibus. 
II~·~·· 96. 
Since the knowledge which man acquired in this world will not be 
destroyed after death, 
••• notitia eorum quae homo in hoc mundo scit, non 
tollitur post mortem. 
De Anima, q.un.a.l5.o. 
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and since this knowledge was of things below the soul, material things, it 
follows that the soul will be able to know at least some material things. 
Moreover, forms which are higher possess those which are lower. Just as 
bodies which are living have the lower form of mere existence and those 
which have sensation are necessarily living, while those which have rational 
knowledge are necessarily sentient, the higher always including the lower 
forms in a more excellent manner. So too, the likenesses of inferior things 
are found in superior beings in a more excellent way. 
• • • anima separata secundum quid intelligit omnia 
naturalia, sed non simpliciter. Ad cujus evidentiam 
considerandum est, quod talis est ordo rerum ad invicem, 
ut quaecumque inveniuntur in inferiori natura, inveni-
antur excellentius in superiori; sicut ea quae sunt in 
istis generabilibus et corruptibilibus, sunt nobiliori 
modo in corporibus caelestibus, sicut in causis univer-
salibus. Calidum enim et frigidum, et alia hujusmodi, 
sunt in istis inferioribus velut quaedam qualitates 
particulares et formae; sed in corporibus caelestibus 
sunt velut quaedam universales virtutes, a quibus 
derivantur in haec inferiora. Similiter etiam et 
quaecumque sunt in natura corporali, sunt eminentius 
in natura intellectuali; fornme enim rerum corporalium 
in ipsis rebus corporalibus sunt materialiter at 
particulariter; in ipsis vero substantiis intellectuali-
bus sunt immaterialiter et universaliter; ••• ex 
divina sapientia profluxerunt formae rerum in sub-
stantiae intellectuales, quibus res intelligerent. 
De Anima, q.un.a.l8.c. 
Now whatever a lower power can do a higher power can do. Since the soul 
united to the body is able to know material things it must be admitted that 
the separated soul will likewise be able to have such kncw;ledge, for its 
mode of existence is higher when separated. Likewise separate substances 
which are superior to the soul can know material things. 
• • • quidquid potest inferior virtus potest virtus 
superior. Sed intellectus hominis, qui est ordine 
naturae infra intellectum Angeli, potest cognoscere 
res materiales. Ergo multo fortius intellectus · 
Angeli. 
~.Theol., I.q.57.a.l. 
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The knowledge which the angels have of material things is not drawn from the 
material things themselves, but rather, from actually intelligible species 
of things which are connatural to separate substances • 
• • • Angelus ••• non autem accipit cognitionem earum 
a rebus materialibus, sed per species actu intelligi-
biles rerum sibi connaturales rerum materialium noti-
tiam habet, sicut intellectus noster secundum species 
quas intelligibiles facit abstrahendo. 
~.Theol., I.q.57.a.l.ad 3um. 
The possible intellect of the separated soul is in potentiality to all 
things intelligible, and is made actual through the influence of separate 
substances which are in act in respect to all intelligible things. There-
fore the separated soul can understand all natural things. 
Again, whatever understands that which is more intelligible understands 
that also which is less so. Since the separated soul understands itself 
and separate substances which are more intelligible than material things it 
ust also be able to understand material things • 
• • • quicumque intelligit majora intelligibilia, in-
telligit etiam minora. • .Si igitur anima separata in-
telligit substantias separatas quae sunt maxima intel-
ligibilia ••• videtur sequi quod intelligat omnia alia 
intelligibilia. • • 
• • .quidquid est in inferiori natura, totum est in 
superiori. Sed anima separata est superior rebus 
naturalibus. Ergo omnia naturalia sunt quodammodo in 
anima. Sed anima oognoscit seipsam. Ergo cognoscit 
omnia naturalia. 
De Anima, q.un.a.l8.c. 
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Although the separated soul can know all natural things yet it does not 
follow from this that the soul knows all singulars. Angels know singulars 
both as to their universal and their individuating principles, since it 
knOWs them by universal forms, a kind of participated similitude of the 
Divine Essence which is the cause of universal and individuating principles. 
Sicut enim a Deo profluxerunt res, ut in propria natura 
subsisterent; ita ex divina sapientia profluxerunt 
formae rerum in substantias intellectuales, quibus res 
intelligerent. 
Now the angelic intellect has perfect knowledge through such species, 
knowing not only the specific natures but also singulars contained in the 
species. However the separated soul, although like the separate substances 
in its mode of operation, is unlike them in its intellective power. Con-
sequently the soul knows the specific natures of things confusedly, and it 
kn~rs only those singulars to which it has some determinate relation. It 
will know some singulars therefore and not others • 
• • • animae separatae non solum cognoscunt species, 
sed individua; non taman omnia, sed aliqua; et ideo 
non oportet quod sint in ea. species infinitae. 
~Anima, q.un.a.l8.a.d 7um. 
Since to know a thing in the universal only is imperfect and incomplete 
knowledge the soul is not perfectly reduced to act, but is in potentiality 
to knowledge of some things. 
• • .quod anima separata habens universalem cognitionem 
scibilium naturalium, non est perfecta reducta in actum; 
quia cognoscere aliquid in universali, est cognoscere 
imperfects et in potentia ••• 
De Anima, q.un.a..l8.a.d 14um. 
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The reason for this is that the separated soul, being inferior to the 
separate substances, cannot perfectly know them, and consequently does not 
clearly see all those things known by these superior intellects. 
• • .quod anima separata non perfecte comprehendit 
substantiam separatam; et ideo non oportet quod 
cognoscat omnia quae in ipsa sunt per similitudinem. 
De Anima, q.un.a.l8. ad lum. 
Now even while united to the body the intellectual soul has knowledge of 
singulars, indirectly it is true, and by reflection. Thus, it considers its 
act and the intelligible species which is the principle of its operation, 
and finally comes to the consideration of the material representation of 
the object and knowledge of singulars, and first of all of those of which 
it received knowledge while united to the body • 
• • • formare propositiones non est nisi intellectus. 
Sed anima etiam conjuncta corpori, format proposi-
tionem cujus subjectum est singulare, praedicatum 
universals; ut cum dico: Socrates est homo; quod non 
possum facere nisi cognoscerem singulare, et com-
parationem ejus ad universale. Ergo etirum anin~ 
separata per intellectum cognoscit singuls.ria ••• 
• • .quidquid pot est virtus inferior, pot est superior. 
Sed sensus potest cognoscere singularia, qui est 
inferior intellectu. Ergo et anima separate. secundum 
intellectum potest singularia cognoscere. 
De Anima, q.un.e..20.c. 
It cannot however know singulars in the same mode as when united to the 
body. 
• •• anima conjuncta corpori per intellectum cognoscit 
singulare, non quidem directe, sed per quandam reflex-
ionem; in quanturr. scilicet ex hoc quod apprehendit suum 
intelligibile, revertitur ad considerandum suum actum, 
et speciem intelligibilem quae est principium suae 
operationis; et ejus speciei originem; et sic venit in 
considerationem phantasmatum, et singule.rium, quorum 
sunt phantasmata. Sed haec reflaxio co.mpleri non potest 
nisi per adjunctionem virtutis cognitativae at imagina-
tivae, quae non sunt in anima separata; unde per modum 
istum anima separata singularia non cognoscit. 
~Anima, q.un.a.20.c. 
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Superior separate substances are able to have knowledge of singulars 
because their intellectual power is proportionate to the universality of 
forms existing in them, end consequently they know the species of all 
natural things existing in a genus and all singulars contained in the 
species. But the power of the separated soul is proportionate to those 
forms abstracted from rna. teris.l thin~;s. Thus the soul will not be able to 
know all natural things completely and distinctly, but it wi 11 be able to 
know those singulars to >mich it has been determined by previous knowledge, 
or by some special affection or aptitude • 
• • • anima separata non cognoscit omnia naturalia, 
etiam secundum species, determinate et complete, sed 
in quadam universalitate et confusione; unde nee 
species influxae sufficiunt in eis ad cognitionem 
singularium, quorum singularium; ad quae anima habet 
aliquem ordinem specialem vel inclinationem, sicut ad 
ea quae patitur, vel ad ea ad quae afficitur, vel 
quorUE. aliquae impressiones et vestigia in ea remanent. 
Onlil.e enim receptum determinatur in recipiente secundum 
modum recipientis. Et sic patet quod anima separata 
cognoscit singularia; non tmnen omnia, sed quaedam. 
De Anima, q.un.a.20.c. 
In answering the objection that because the soul while united to the 
body can know singulars only through the senses and not directly, the 
separated soul will be unable to know singulars at all, St. Thomas points 
out that the separated soul will be, in a way, like superior separate sub-
stances and able to receive from them influx of intelligible species, 
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through Which it will knovr singulars. The soul united to the body will not 
be free to receive such species, not because its nature is different when 
separated, but because it is in a sense, cut off by the body from receiving 
such influence. 
• • .anima separate. sit ejusdem naturae cum anima con-
juncta corpori: tamen propter separationem a corpore 
habet aspectum liberum ad substantias superiores, ut 
possit per eas recipere influxum intelligibilium 
formarum, per quas singularia cognoscat; quod non 
potest dum est corpori unite., ut in superioribus 
ostensum est. 
.E;: Anima, q.un.a.20. ad l5um. 
Thus both the separated soul and the soul united to the body will be able 
to know singulars, but according to different modes. The separated soul, 
having a mode of existence superior in itself, will know singulars according 
to a superior mode, though one less perfect for the soul. 
It is objected that the act of knowledge acquired here cannot remain 
in the separated soul because to consider what was previously known is an 
act of the memory and memory is destroyed together vnth the corruption of 
the body. 
Videtur quod actus scientiae hie acquisitae non maneat 
in anima separate. ••• corrupto corpore, anima neque 
reminiscitur, neque amat. Sed cons~derare ea. quae 
prius novit, est reminisci. Ergo anima separate. non 
potest habere actum scientiae qurum hie acquisivit. 
~.Theol., I.q.89.e .• 6. 
It must be remembered that the memory which will be destroyed at the death 
of the body belongs to the sensitive part of man, but memory considered as 
the power of retaining species exists, not in any corporeal organ, but in 
the intellectual part for, 
••• ratione memoriae sit conservare species rerum quae 
actu non apprehenduntur, hoc primum considerari oportet, 
utrum species intelligibiles sic in intellectu conservari 
possint. 
Sum.Theol., I.q.79.a.6.c. 
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Those things which were previously understood are preserved in the intellect 
and are not destroyed by the death of the body. St. Thomas meets the fur-
ther objection that in this present life the soul cannot understand by in~ 
telligible species without turning to the phantasm, and since the intelli-
gible species cannot have greater power in the separated soul than in the 
soul united to the body, when there are no phantasms to which it can turn, 
understanding through species here acquired is impossible. 
• • .incorporalium non sunt aliqua phantasmata; quia 
imaginatio tempus et continuum non transcendit. Si 
ergo intellectus noster non posset aliquid intelligere 
in actu, nisi converteretur ad phantasmata, sequeretur 
quod non posset intelligere incorporeum aliquid. • • 
~.Theel., I.q.84.a.7.ob. 
In replying to this objection st. Thomas points out that in any action two 
things must be considered, first, the species, which is determined by the 
object and secondly, the mode, which is determined by the power of the 
agent. Thus, that an object is seen by the eye is due to the species of 
the object in the eye, but that it is seen clearly is due to the perfection 
of the visual power. Now the intelligible species remain in the separated 
soul as was said, consequently the soul ~~11 know what it formerly knaw. 
But as the mode of existence of the separated soul is different its mode of 
operation will likewise be different, and consequently it will not need the 
phantasm. 
• • .impossibile est intellectum nostrum secundum prae-
sentis vitae statum quo passibili corpori conjungitur 
aliquid in actu, nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata ••• 
~.Theol., I.q.84.a.7.c • 
• • • in actu est duo considerare: Scilicet speciem actus, 
et modum ipsius. Et species quidem actus consideratur 
ex objectio, in quod actus cognoscitivae virtutis diri-
gitur per speciem, quae est objecti similitude; sed modus 
actus pensatur ex virtute agentis; sicut quod aliquis 
videat lapidem, contingit ex specie lapidis, quae est in 
oculo; sed quod acute videat, contingit ex virtute visiva 
oculi. Cum igitur species intelligibiles maneant in 
anima separata ••• status autem animae separatae non sit 
idem sicut modo est; sequitur quod secundum species in-
telligibiles hie acquisitas anima separata intelligere 
possit quae prius intellexit; non tamen eadem modo, 
scilicet per conversionem ad phantasroata, sed per modum 
convenientem aniroae separatae. Et ita manet quidem in 
anima separata actus scientiae hie acquisitae, sed non 
secundum eumdem modum. 
~.Theel., I.q.89.a.6. 
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It is further objected that since habits produce acts similar to those 
whereby they are acquired and the acts whereby the habit of knowledge is 
here acquired are not adapted to the separated soul, no act of kn~vledge 
here acquired can be produced by the separated soul. It is true that in 
the present life the intellect acquires the habit of knowledge by turning 
to the phantasms, which it cannot do when in a separate state of existence. 
But since habits produce acts similar in species. but not necessarily similar 
in mode to those acts whereby the habits are acquired, the objection does 
not hold. 
• •• actus per quos acquiritur habitus, sunt similes 
actibus quos habitus causant, quantum ad specie.m actus, 
non autem quantum ad modum agendi. Nam operari justa, 
sed non justa, id est delectabiliter, causat habitum 
justitiae politicae, per quem deleotabiliter operamur. 
~.Theol., I.q.89.a.6.e.d 3um. 
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Since the separated soul understands in a mode suited to it as existing 
apart from the body, things which were impediments to its understanding 
while united to the body will no longer be so. Thus while the soul was in 
the body in order for it to carry on its proper operation the sense and the 
sensible object had in some way to come into contact. This contact might 
be impeded by local distance. An object afar off, for example, would not 
be seen clearly and consequently could not be known distinctly. Now the 
sensible faculties by which the phantasnw are produced do not remain in 
the separated soul. Since local distance is an impediment only in so far as 
the senses are concerned it follows that the impediment no longer exists 
when the soul no longer requires the senses. 
And: 
• • .anima separata cognosceret singularia abstrahendo 
a sensibilibus. Quod si asset verum, posset dici quod 
distantia localis impediret animae separatae cognitionem. 
Requireretur enim quod vel sensibilia agerent in animam 
separatam, vel anima separata in sensibilia; et quantum 
ad utrumque requireretur distantia determinata. Sed 
praedicta positio est impossibilis; quia abstratio 
specierum a sensibilibus fit mediantibus sensibus, at 
aliis potentiis sensitivis, quae in anima separata actu 
non manent. Intelligit autent anima separata singularia 
per influxum specierum ex divino lumina; quod quidem 
lumen aequaliter sa habet ad propinquum et distans. 
~nde distantia localis nullo modo impedit animae 
separatae cognitionem. 
Sum.Theol., I.q.89.a.7.c. 
••• manifestum est in eisdem quod looalis distantia 
cognitionem animae separatae impedire non potest. 
Localis enim distantia per se comparatur ad sensum, 
non autem ad intellectum, nisi per accidens, inquantum 
a sensu accipit: nam sensibilia secundum determinatrum 
distantiam movent sensum; intelligibilia autem acti, 
secundum quod movent intellectum, non sunt in loco, cum 
sint a materia corporali separata. Cum igitur substantiae 
separatae non accipiant intellectivam cognitionem a 
sensibilibus, in eorum cognitionem distantia localis 
nihil operatur. 
II Cont.Gent., 96. 
90 
Did these sensitive powers remain the soul, as some have said, local distanc 
would be an impediment. 
Dicunt etiam, quod sunt duplices potentiae sensitivae; 
quadedam quae sunt in ipsa anima principium interiorum 
actuum; et instaemanent in anima separata, corpore 
destructio cum suis actibus; quaedam vero sunt principia 
exteriorum actuum, quae sunt in an~A simul at corpore, 
at pereunte corpore, pereunt. Sed haec positio stare 
non potest. 
De Anima, q.un.a.l9.c. 
Thus the soul will understand without the aid of the senses and like separat 
substances will be indifferent to what is near or far. 
• • .quod intellectus indiget auxilio sensus secundum 
statum imperfectae cognitionis, prout scilicet accipit 
a phantasmatibus; non autem secundum perfectionem cog-
nitionis modum, qui competit animae separatae; sicut 
homo indiget lacte in pueritia, nam t~£n in perfecta 
aetate. 
~Anima, q.un.a.l9.ad 19. 
Because local distance does not impede the knowledge of the separated soul 
it does not follow that distance of time does not impede it. Rather dis-
tance of time does impede this kn~<ledge, for the soul cannot know future 
things naturally. One cannot argue from distance of space to distance of 
time for what is locally distant actually exists, but what is distant in 
time does not actually exist and consequently is unknowable • 
• • • quod distantia secundum locum sunt in rerum natura. 
et participant aliquam speciem, cujus similitude est in 
Angelo; quod non est verum de futuris, ••• et ideo non 
est simile. 
91 
~.Theol., I.q.57.a.3.ad 4um. 
The future can be known in two ways, first, in its cause, as one can know 
that an oak tree will come from an acorn, or that an eclipse will take 
place in the future • 
and, 
• • • dupliciter possunt futura cognosci: uno modo in 
seipsis, alia modo in suis causis. In seipsis quidem 
a nullo cognosci possunt nisi a Deo: cujus ratio est, 
quia futura, prout futura sunt., nondum habent esse in 
seipsis; esse autem et verum convertuntur; unde cum 
omnis cognitio respiciens futura in ratione futuri, 
cognoscat ea in seipsis. 
• • .unumquodque hoc modo cognoscitur in aliquo quo 
est in eo. Quaedam igitur futura in causis suis 
proxirr~s determinata sunt hoc modo, ut ex eis neces-
saria contingant, sicut Solem oriti eras; et tales 
effectus futuri in suis causis cognosci possunt. 
E!:, ~·· q.8.a.l2. 
In this way the soul, whether present in the body or separate from it, is 
able to know the future. Secondly, the future can be known in itself, and 
in this manner even casual and chance events can be known • 
• • • apparet quod Deus non entium notitirum habet; non 
tamen omnia non entia eamdem habent habitudinem ad 
eius scientirum: ea enim quae non sunt, ~ec erunt, nee 
fuerunt, a Deo sciuntur quasi eius virtuti possibilia. 
~nde non cognoscit ea ut existentia aliqualiter in se 
ipsis, sed existentia solum in divina potentia; quae 
quidem a quibusdam dicuntur a Deo cognosci secundum 
notitiam simplicis intelligentiae. Ea vero quae sunt 
praesentia, praeterita, vel futura nobis cognoscit 
Deus secundum quod sunt in potentia sua, et in 
propriis causis, et in se ipsis: et horum cognitio 
dicitur notitia visionis. Non enim Deus rerum quae 
And: 
apud nos nondum sunt, videt solum esse quod habent in 
suis causis, sed etiam illud quod habent in se ipsis, 
inquantum eius aeternitas est praesent sua indivi-
sibilitate omni tempori; et twmen esse uniuscumque rei 
Deus cognoscit per essentiam suam: nam sua essentia 
est repraesentabilis secundum multa quae non .sunt, nee 
erunt, nee fuerunt: ipsa etiam est similitude virtutis 
cuiuslibet causae, secundum quam praeexistunt effectus 
in causis: esse etiam cujuslibet rei quod habet in se 
ipsa, est ab ea exemplariter deductum. Sic igitur non 
entia cognoscit Deus, inquantum aliquo modo habeat esse 
vel in potentia Dei, vel in causis suis, vel in se 
ipsis; quod rationi scientiae non obsistit ••• 
I ~.Gent., 66. 
••• Deus futura contingentia sciat ••• 
I Cont.Gent.87. 
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This knowledge of future things belongs to God alone however, and is not 
naturally possible to any created intellect. The intellectual soul, like 
all created intellects, can understand only by species. Now things not yet 
existing have no nature whereby they can be likened to species existing in 
the mind of separate substances and known. Therefore Angelic intellects 
cannot know the future in itself, much less can the separated soul • 
• • • species quae sunt in intellectu Angeli, quantum 
est de se, aequaliter se habeant ad praesentia, prae-
terita, et futura; tamen praesentia, praeterita, et 
futura non aequaliter se habent ad species •• • ; quia 
ea quae praesentia sunt, habent naturam per quam 
assirr~lantur speciebus quae sunt in mente Angeli; et 
sic per eas cognosci possunt. Sed quae futura sunt, 
nondum habent naturam per quam illis assimilentur. 
~nde per eas cognosci non possunt. 
~.Theol., I.q.57.a.3. ad 3um • 
• • • species quae sunt in mente Angeli, non se habent 
aequaliter ad praesentia, et futura: quia illa quae 
sunt praesentia, sunt similia inactu formis in Angelis 
rr-------------------------------~ 
existentibus, et sic per ea possunt cognosci; illa 
vero quae sunt futura, nondum sunt similia; et ideo 
per formas praedictas non cognosountur ••• 
~ Ver., q.8.a.l2. ad lum. 
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Since local distance does not impede the knowledge of the separated 
soul, as was said, it might seem that these souls know what takes place on 
earth. 
Videtur quod animae separatae cognoscant ea quae hie 
aguntur. 
Sum.T~eol., I.89.a.s.c. 
This does not follow however, for it is not local distance which prevents 
the separated soul from having knowledge of what takes place here, but 
rather the soul's mode of existence Dnpedes such knowledge. The soul has 
knowledge of those singulars to which it is in some way determined, either 
by knowledge acquired in union with the body or by Divine ordinance. The 
soul existing apart from the body has existence as a separate substance and 
is not determined to corporeal things, things, that is, of this world. 
Therefore it cannot naturally have direct knowledge of what happens here • 
• • • animae separatae non impediuntur a oognoscendis 
quae sunt hie, propter loci distantiam; sed quia non 
est in eis tanta efficacia intellectivae virtutis, 
ut per species influxas omnia singularia cognoscere 
possint. 
~Anima. 1 q.un.a.20. ad 3um. 
This is because a thing is received according to the disposition of the 
thing receiving it, and the separated soul is in no way naturally disposed 
to receive directly knowledge of this world • 
• • • animae vero separatae non possunt cognoscere per 
hujusmodi species nisi solum singularia illa ad quae 
quodam modo determinantur vel per naturalem habitudinem, 
vel per divinam ordinationem; quia omne quod recipitur 
in aliquo, recipitur in eo per modum recipientis. 
~.Theol., I.q.89.a.4.c. 
Animae autem mortuorum secundum ordinationem divinam 
et secundum modum essendi segregatae sunt a conver-
satione viventium, et conjunctae conversationi spiri-
tualium substantiarum quae sunt a corpore separatae; 
unde ea quae apud nos aguntur, ignorant. 
~-Theol., I.q.89.a.s.c. 
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But just as the soul can know singulars indirectly so too can it receive 
indirect knowledge of what happens in this world. Being a separated soul 
it can know and consequently receive knowledge from other separated souls. 
Thus the soul can have some knowledge of the affairs of this world. 
Possunt etiam facta viventium non per seipsos cognoscere, 
sed vel per animas eorum qui hinc ad eos accedunt, vel 
per Angelos seu daemones, vel etiam Spiritu Dei reve-
lante ••• 
~.Theel., I.q.89.a.s. ad lum. 
The objection has been raised that the separated soul cannot know 
separate substances. Since the soul joined to the body is more perfect 
than the separated soul and yet is unable to understand separate substances, 
it would seem that the separated soul would be still more incapable of such 
knowledge • 
• • • anima unita corpori est perfectior quam separata, 
ut videtur; quia quaelibet pars perfectior est unita 
toti quam separata. Si igitur anima unita corpori 
non potest intelligere substantiae separatas, videtur 
quod nee a corpore separata. 
De Anima, q.un.a.l7.c. 
Although it is true that the soul united to the body is more perfect accord-
ing to its nature than separated, yet the separated soul is more perfect as 
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regards its intellectual operation. Consequently the separated soul will be 
more capable of understanding separate substances than is the soul united 
to the body. 1.:oreover, independence of matter makes a thing to be a proper 
term of intellect, and the separated soul, free from the weight of the body, 
has nothing to impede its knowledge, consequently it will be able to under-
stend other separated souls and even superior separate substances. 
Si autem substantiae separatae intelligunt ea quae 
sunt per se intelligibilia, ut est ostensum ••• per 
se autem intelligibilia sunt substantiae separatae, 
immunitas enim a materia facit aliquid esse per se 
intelligibile, ••• sequitur quod substantiae sepa-
ratae intelligant sicut propria objecta substantas 
separatas. Unaquaeque igitur et se ipsam, et 
alias cognoscet. 
II Cont .Gent., 98. 
Moreover, even while united to the body the soul understands itself', though 
indirectly, 
••• anima nostra se ipsam cognoscit ••• 
~ ::!.::::·, q.a.a.6.c. 
Since the soul united to the body understands only through the phantasm it 
is unable .to understand itself directly, as there can be no phantasm of the 
soul. The separated soul, reduced to act through the influence of separate 
substances, will understand itself through itself, and will know those 
things having the same nature and mode of existence as itself. 
• • .anima humana alio modo cognoscet seipsam cum 
fuerit separata; et alio modo nunc ••• 
.£:!.Anima, q.un.e..l7. ad 9um. 
Further, like is known by like, thus, separated souls, having the same 
nature and mode of existence vdll be able to know one another. 
• • .simile a simili cognoscitur. Sed anima separata 
est substantia separata. Ergo potest intelligere 
substantias separatas. 
De Anima, q.un.a.l7.c. 
Again, likeness is the cause of knowledge, 
••• similitude est causa cognitionis. 
De "'!:.!._•, q.s.a.7.c. 
Since the separated soul can understand material things much more is it 
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able to understand separated souls, for it is of the same nature as they. 
Every separate substance understands what is above itself and what is 
below itself, according to its mode of existence. 
• • .animae separatae cognoscunt alias animas separa-
tas ••• Est autem commune omni substantiae separatae 
quod intelligat id quod est supra se, et id quod est 
infra se, per modum suae substantiae. 
~.Theol., I.q.89.a.2.c. 
Consequently after the death of the body, the soul, being itself a separate 
substance, will be able to understand in a measure superior separate sub-
stances. Although the separated soul understands itself through itself, it 
vnll not be able to understand separate substances through itself, but 
rather, through impressed species. 1/.oreover the angels are superior to the 
human intellect and therefore will not be perfectly understood so far as 
the natural knowledge of the soul is concerned. 
The angels know themselves and other angels through impressed species 
existing in the angelic intellect. Since the intellectual power of the 
angels is proportionate to these species, the knowledge thus acquired is 
perfect. 
r 
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• • .unicuique Angelo impressa est ratio suae spec1e1 
secundum esse naturale et intellectuale simul, ita 
scilicet quod in natura suae speciei subsisteret, et 
per eam se intelligeret; aliarum vero naturarum, tam 
spiritualium quam corporalium, rationes sunt ei im-
pressae secundum esse intellectuale tantum, ut vide-
licet per hujusmodi species impressas tam creaturas 
corporales quam spirituales cognosceret. 
~.Theol., I.q.56.a.2.c. 
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The intellectual soul, being inferior to the angels, has imperfect knowledge 
of them according to this mode however • 
• • • anima separata intuendo directe essentiam suam, 
cognoscet substantias separatas secundum influentiam 
receptam ab eis, vel a superiori causa, scilicet Deo; 
nam tarr~n ita perfecta cognoscet substantias separatas 
naturali cognitione, sicut ipsae cognoscunt se invicem ••• 
De Anima, q.un.a.l7.c. 
Just as the soul is unable to know itself through its essence, so too is it 
ble to know separate substances through its essence. Rather, the soul 
ows what is above it through impressed species. 
The separated soul can know not only itself and other separated souls, 
superior separate substances by natural knowledge, but it can also know 
••• homines per sua naturalia Deum cognoscere possunt ••• 
~.Theel., I.q.56.a.3.c. 
However, as the soul is incapable of perfect knowledge of separate sub-
stances it is even more impotent ~~th regard to knowledge of God. 
Virtus autem divinae essentiae, qua est intelligibilis, 
excedit intellectum angelicum, et omnem intellectum 
creatum, secundum hoc quod est cognoscitivus: veritas 
enim divinae essentiae, qua cog;noscibilis est, excedit 
lumen cuiuslibet intellectus creati, quo cognoscitivus 
est. Et ideo impossibile est quod aliquis intellectus 
creatus divinrum essentiam comprehendat, non quia partem 
aliquam eius ignoret, sed quia ad perfectum modum cog-
nitionis ipsius pertingere non potest. 
De :!!!!:_•, q.8.a.2.c. 
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As matter without form is wholly unknowable so, inversely, infinity of form 
not limited by matter is supremely knowable • 
• • • infinitum quod se tenet ex parte materiae non per-
fectae per formrum, ignotum est secundum se, quia omnis 
cogniUo est per formam; sed infinitum quod se tenet ex 
parte formae non limitatae per materiam, est secundum 
se maxime notum. Sic autem Deus est infinitus ••• 
Sum.Theol., I.q.l2.a.r.e.d 2um. 
But the human intellect is proportionate to the lowest intelligible forms, 
natures of material things, and is incapable of attaining naturally to an 
adequate lcnowledge of God, ~no exceeds every kind of knowledge • 
• • • Deus ••• est supra omne existens in quantum est 
suum esse. Unde ex hoc non sequitur quod nullo modo 
possit cognosci; sed quod omnem cognitionem excedat; 
quod est ipsum non comprehendi. 
Ibid., ad 3um. 
Cognitum autem est in cognoscente secundum modum 
cognoscentis. Unde cujuslibet cognoscentis cog-
nitio est secundum modum suae naturae. Si igitur 
modus essendi alicujus rei cognitae excedat modum 
naturae cognoscentis, oportet quod cognitio illius 
rei sit supra naturam illius cognoscentis. 
Sum.Theol., I.q.l2.a.4.c. 
Therefore unless the soul have the light of Glory it cannot see the Essence 
of God. 
• •• Non igitur potest intellectus creatus Deum per 
essentiam videre, nisi in quantum Deus per suam 
gratiam se intellectui creato conjungit ut intel-
ligibilem ab ipso. 
Ibid. 
r 
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• • .quamvis intellectus noster sit ractus ad hoc quod 
videat Deum, non tamen ut naturali sua virtute Deum 
videre possit, sed per lumen gloriae sibi inrusum. 
Et ideo omni velamina remota nondum oportet quod in-
tellectus Deum per essentiam videat, si lumen gloriae 
non illustretur: ipsa enim carentia gloriae erit 
divinae visionis impedimentum. 
~ Ver., q.lO.a.ll. ad 7um. 
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The separated soul no longer understands by turning to the phantasm so 
the question arises, does the acting intellect by which the intelligible 
species are abstracted remain in the soul? If so, what is its function? 
St. Thomas answers that the acting intellect does remain in the soul 
because it is natural and what is natural remains • 
• • • eaedam potentiae intellectivae quae nunc sunt in 
anima, erunt in separe.ta, quia naturales: naturalia 
autem oportet manere, quamvis nunc habeant ordinam ad 
corpus, quem tunc non habebunt ••• 
~ Ver. 1 q.l9.a .• I.ad Sum. 
:fuatever operations of the soul are performed without a corporeal organ are 
in the soul as both their principle and subject. The acting intellect is 
not subjected in the compositum, but rather belongs to the soul alone as its 
subject. It must, then, remain in the separated soul • 
And: 
• • • in anima separata renWillebit potentia intellectiva, 
et intellectus agens, et possibilis: ••• 
~·~ ad 6um. 
••• omnes potentiae aniu~e comparantur ad animam solam 
sicut ad principium. Sed quaedam potentiae comparantur 
ad animam solam sicut ad subjectum, ut intellectus et 
voluntas; et huiusmodi potentiae necesse est quod maneant 
in anima, corpore destructo. 
~-Theol., I.q.77.a.8.c. 
r 
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There must be in man's nature an active and a potential intellect, neither 
of which can be separated from the soul of man. 
• • .in natura cuiuslibet moventis est principium suf-
ficiens ad operationem eiusdem: et si quidem operatic 
illa consistat in actione, adest ei principium activum 
••• si vero operatic illa consistat in passione, adest 
ei principium passivum ••• Homo autem est perfectissimus 
inter omnia inferiora moventia: eius autem propria, et 
naturalis operatic est intelligere, quae non completur 
sine passione quadrun, inquantum quilibet intellectus 
patitur ab intelligibili; nee etiam sine actione, in-
quantum intelleotus faoit intelligibilia in potentia, 
esse intelligibilia in actu. Oportet igitur in 
natura hominis esse utriusque proprium principium, 
scilicet intellectum agentem, et possibilem, et 
neutrum secundum esse ab anin~ hominis separatum esse. 
II ~·~·• 76. 
Now the function of the acting intellect which is most stressed is its 
making the potentially intelligible to be actually intelligible. However a 
further function of the acting intellect is suggested. Supposing the phan-
tasms to be made actually intelligible by a separate acting intellect it 
would still be necessary that the human soul have some active power drawn 
from that Separate Intellect by which the soul could make things intelligibl 
actually. 
Posuerunt ergo quidam hunc intellectum sectmdum sub-
stantiam separatum esse intellectum agentem, qui 
quasi illustrando phantasmata facit ea intelligibilia 
actu. 
Sed dato quod sit aliquis talis intellectus agens 
separatus, nihilominus taman oportet ponere in ipsa 
anima humana aliquam virtutem ab illo intellectus 
superiori participatam, per quan1 anima facit intelli-
gibilia in actu. • • 
~.Theol., I.q.79.a.4.c. 
Now what is actually intelligible does not need to be made more intelligible. 
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Were this power of the acting intellect merely to render actually intelligi-
ble what was already intelligible it would seem superfluous. Yet the acting 
intellect is natural to man and nature does nothing in vain. 
st. Thomas points out that two things are necessary for intellectual 
vision, power of sight and union of the thing seen with the faculty of 
vision, vision being made actual only when the thing seen is in a certain 
way in the seer. 
• • .ad visionem tam sensibilem, quam intelleotualem, 
duo requireuntur, scilicet virtus visiva, et unio rei 
visae cum visu. Non enim fit visio in actu, nisi per 
hoc quod res visa quodammodo est invidente. 
~.Theol., I.q.l2.a.2.c. 
In another place st. Thomas maintains that through the possible intellect 
the separated soul will receive species from superior separate substances 
and through the acting intellect it will have power of understanding. 
Operatic intellectus agentis et possibilis respicit 
phantasmata secundum quod est anima corpori unita. 
Sed cum erit anima a corpore separata, per intel-
lectum possibilem respiciet species effluentes a 
substantiis superioribus, et per intellectum agentem 
habebit virtutem ad intelligendum. 
De Anima, q.un.a.l5.c. 
Now the possible intellect is that whereby the soul understands, 
••• intellectus possibilis est quo intelligit anima. 
]2! Anima, q.un.a.3.c. 
yet the potential intellect must be made actual and nothing potential can 
render itself actual, but must be made actual by what is in act. Then this 
power by ;W1ich the soul can become actually knowing must be something in the 
soul itself, and not the work of an outside agent. This is because no agent 
102 
works except by some power which is formally in the agent as a constituent 
of its being. 
Nihil operatur nisi per aliquam virtutem, quae formaliter 
in ipso est. • • 
II ~.Gent., 76. 
The impression of the intelligible species upon the potential intellect must 
in some way be brought about by the action of a power in the soul, for St. 
Thomas points out that the intellectual operation cannot be effected in us 
through the mere impression of some superior beings • 
• • • non tamen ita quod intellectualis operatic causetur 
in nobis ex sola impressions aliquarum rerum superiorem ••• 
s~~.Theol., I.q.84.a.6.c. 
St. Thomas likens the acting intellect to a kind of light and he says that 
through the acting intellect the soul will have the power of understanding, 
as was said. 
Unde et virtus intellectualis creaturae lumen quodam 
intelligibile dicitur, quasi a prima luce derivatum, 
siva hoc intelligatur de virtute naturali, siva de 
aliqua perfections superaddita gratiae, vel gloriae. 
Sum.Theol., I.q.l2.a.2.c. 
It would seem that the acting intellect has a function beyond abstracting 
the intelligible species from the phantasm, and making them to be actually 
intelligible. :!\Caking them actually intelligible might be taken in two 
senses, first in regard to the phantasm, making it to be intelligible in 
act: 
• • .intellectum agentem facit phe.ntasmata a sensibus 
accepta intelligibilia in actu per modum abstractionis 
cujusdam. 
Sum.Theol., I.q.84.a.6.c. 
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Secondly, in regard to the potential intellect, by effecting the union of 
the intelligible species with the possible intellect, so that the possible 
intellect can actually understand. This might account for both the ex-
pression: 
and: 
••• per intellectum agentem habebit virtutem ad in-
telligendum ••• 
~ Anima, q.un.a.l5.c. 
• • .sed forte ad praebendum lumen intelligibile in-
telligenti. • • 
Sum.Theol., I.q.79.a.3.c. 
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